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ARE STORYLINES PATENTABLE?
TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Anu R. Sawkar*
This Note examines doctrinal issues relating to the patentability of
nonphysical inventions by assessing a proposal to patent storylines for use
in books and movies. Analyzing recent and historical case law regarding
the limits of patentable subject matter, this Note identifies four points of
doctrinal tension whose resolution will determine the extent to which
nonphysical inventions, such as the storyline proposal, are patentable. This
Note suggests how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should
resolve these tensions in upcoming cases and proposes boundaries for the
patentability of nonphysical inventions.
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law is failing writers. At least that is how novelist Leon Arden
felt after losing a legal battle with Columbia Pictures over a plotline he
created.' Arden alleges that the movie studio copied his story to produce
the blockbuster film Groundhog Day2 without giving him credit. 3 Arden is
not the only writer who has used the courts to try to protect the products of
his creativity against theft by Hollywood. Indeed, federal courts regularly
entertain claims by the authors of screenplays or novels that popular movies
have infringed their copyrights4-with mixed results. 5
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D., 2005, The Scripps
Institute; B.A., 2000, Northwestern University. I would like to thank Professor Jeanne C.
Fromer and Raymond C. Woodring for their invaluable support and comments.
1. See Sathnam Sanghera, A Gnawing Kind of Pain, FT.com, June 18, 2004,
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=%22A+gnawing+kind+of+pain%22+&y=0&aje=fa
lse&x=0&id=040618004725&ct=-0&nclickcheck = 1 (interviewing Leon Arden).
2. Groundhog Day (Columbia Pictures 1993).
3. See Sanghera, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241 (11 th Cir. 1999) (the movie
Lone Star); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996) (the movie Jurassic Park);
Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 1996) (the movie Passion Fish); Beal v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (the movie Coming to America); Kouf v. Walt
Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1994) (the movie Honey, I Shrunk the
Kids); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (the movie ET.); Chase-Riboud
v. Dreamworks, 987 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (the movie Amistad); Arden v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (the movie Groundhog
Day); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (the movie
Raiders of the Lost Ark).
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American copyright law has protected the written expression of stories
since the first Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 1790.6 Yet
while the movie adaptation of a written work will itself qualify for
copyright protection, 7 it will infringe the source material only if it is
substantially similar to the underlying work.8 Plaintiffs occasionally do
succeed in demonstrating sufficient similarity between their work and an
unauthorized derivation,9 but courts frequently reject these infringement
claims, 10 leaving the authors with no recourse.
Consider Leon Arden's example. In Arden v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,
Arden brought a claim for infringement of his published novel, One Fine
Day, about a man trapped in a repeating day.II Arden alleged that the film
Groundhog Day copied several elements of his novel, including "the plot,
mood, characters, pace, setting, and sequence of events." 12 Although the
district court judge Denny Chin granted Columbia Pictures' motion for
summary judgment, he acknowledged that "the Novel and the Film are
based on the same idea, a man trapped in a day that repeats itself over and
over."' 13 Nevertheless, the court held that the novel and the film express the
idea differently, and that the similarities between the works "relate only to
unprotectible ideas, concepts, or abstractions."'14 The opinion further noted
5. See infra note 9 for cases where the author won. See supra note 4 for cases where
the author lost.
6. See I Cong. ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version codified generally at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (conferring copyright protection on maps, charts, and books).
7. A copyright confers rights to any derivative work-i.e., any "work based upon one
or more preexisting works," including "any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (2000).
8. Arden, 908 F. Supp. at 1249. For a comprehensive examination of copyright
infringement in motion picture screenplays, see Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin'
Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare, Copyright Infringement and the Motion Picture
Screenplay: Towardan Improved Framework, 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 359 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(holding that defendant's motion picture infringed plaintiff's stage play, where there were
extensive similarities in the details and incidents of the two works and "the dramatic
significance of the scenes ... is the same, almost to the letter"); see also Metcalf v. Bochco,
294 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "[t]he similarities between the relevant
works are striking" and holding that "[t]he cumulative weight of these similarities allows the
Metcalfs to survive summary judgment.").
10. See supra note 4 (listing cases where courts rejected a plaintiff author's copyright
infringement claim).
11. Arden, 908 F. Supp. at 1249.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1249-50. The court compared the two works:
The Novel is dark and introspective, featuring witchcraft and an encounter with
God. It is marked, for example, by an explosion on an airplane that kills 192
people, the rape of one young woman, and the suicide of another. These tragic
events recur as the day repeats itself over and over again. In contrast, the Film is
essentially a romantic comedy about an arrogant, self-centered man who evolves
into a sensitive, caring person who, for example, in his repeating day, saves a boy
falling out of a tree, changes a flat tire for several elderly women, and learns to
play the piano.
Id. at 1250.
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that, "[b]ecause the copyright law only protects the expression of ideas,
rather than ideas themselves, it is clear that the idea of a repeating day, even
if first conceived by plaintiff, is not protectible."' 5
In a 2004 interview, Arden discussed his feelings about the litigation's
outcome, stating, "The worst thing... was when all the reviews of the film
came through and all of them said how wonderful the idea was.... Many
said the idea was 'genius.' I can't tell you how bad that felt. Because they
were really saying how good I was, but nobody knew."' 16 Arden noted that
not receiving credit for commercial ideas has a particularly devastating
impact because such ideas "put you on the map."' 17 He stated that he gladly
would have sold the rights to his story for less than the costs of litigation
because simply receiving credit would have generated interest in his
novel. 18 Indeed, the judge noted in the Arden opinion that he could
"appreciate [Arden's] frustration at seeing his idea of a man trapped in a
repeating day used, without his consent, in a movie that has grossed more
than $70 million, not one cent of which he has received," but he reiterated
that copyright law did not provide the protection Arden sought.' 9
Patent attorney Andrew Knight proposes an unusual solution to the
problem that Arden and other writers face in protecting the ideas underlying
their stories. Knight argues that copyright law should not be the only
protection regime available for writers. 20 Rather, noting that software can
be protected by both patents and copyright, Knight argues that storylines
also warrant dual protection.21 Whereas copyright only protects the written
expression of a single embodiment of a storyline,22 Knight argues that
patents can be used to protect the underlying storyline itself, separate from
any particular written expression based on it.23 While patenting storylines
may seem counterintuitive, 24 Knight proposes that framing a storyline
invention as a patentable process can serve as the statutory basis for
procuring a patent, and he believes that he can draft a patent application for
a storyline process that will comply with all the statutory requirements for
15. Id. at 1259.
16. Sanghera, supra note 1.
17. Id. ("I think every writer gets two, maybe three, really commercial ideas in his
life .... They may not be his best books, but they are the most commercial ones. Faulkner
had a couple. Nabokov had Lolita. When they steal from you, that's bad enough, but when
they steal a commercial idea that could put you on the map, it's just unbearable.").
18. See id. ("[T]he funny thing about Columbia Pictures is that they used up $60,000
defending the film in court-I would have accepted that as the sale price. The film would
have come out, then the book would have sold more and, in turn, I would have got more.").
19. Arden, 908 F. Supp. at 1264.
20. See generally Andrew F. Knight, A Potentially New IP: Storyline Patents, 86 J. Pat.
& Trademark Off. Soc'y 859 (2004).
21. Id.
22. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (defining works eligible for copyright
protection).
23. See Knight, supra note 20, at 859.
24. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Box Office Patents, Forbes.com, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2005/08/15/patent-movies-scripts-cz-df_0812script.html
(discussing why "[t]he idea isn't as crazy as it sounds").
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patent protection.25 In fact, Knight already has filed four such storyline
patent applications, 26 and he now advertises his services for preparing
similar storyline applications for clients. 27
Knight suggests that because copyright protection is too limited and state
law protections are too varied to be adequate,28 patent protection is the right
vehicle to solve a problem such as Arden's. But Knight's attempt to use the
statutory eligibility of processes to protect this unusual subject matter faces
complication because courts recently have begun to scrutinize the scope of
patentable subject matter.29 Thus, to evaluate the long-term potential of
Knight's proposal to patent storylines, one must review recent
developments in the case law regarding the trajectory of the scope of
patentable subject matter, particularly regarding the scope of patentable
processes.
This Note examines the current scope of patentable subject matter in
order to explore the basis for Knight's claim that an original storyline can
constitute a patentable process. Part I of this Note provides a brief
overview of the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent, reviews the
current case law regarding patentable subject matter, and concludes with a
discussion of Knight's legal and policy-based rationales for allowing
storyline patents. Part 1I explores in detail several tensions in the case law
regarding patentable subject matter that have created controversies and
paved the way for likely future revisions regarding the proper scope of
patentable processes. Specifically, Part II focuses on ambiguities in courts'
approaches to applying the doctrines of patentable processes, judicial
exclusions to patentable subject matter, "mental steps," and the
technological arts requirement. Finally, Part III analyzes whether storylines
claimed as processes are indeed patentable subject matter under current case
law. Part III concludes that storyline processes are not patentable subject
matter under the most recent case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and recommends that the Federal Circuit limit the scope
of patentable processes by clarifying some of the ambiguities in the case
law as it stands today.
25. See Knight, supra note 20, at 866-68.
26. See U.S. Patent Application No. 10/869,082 (filed June 17, 2004); U.S. Patent
Application No. 10/861,849 (filed June 7, 2004); U.S. Patent Application No. 10/846,544
(filed May 17, 2004); U.S. Patent Application No. 10/722,473 (filed Nov. 28, 2003).
27. Andrew F. Knight's web site provides information about storyline patents and
describes the services offered. Knight and Associates, The First and Best in Storyline
Patents, http://www.plotpatents.com/about-us.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2008).
28. For an introduction to state law doctrines used to protect film and television show
ideas, see Aileen Brophy, Note, Whose Idea Is It Anyway? Protecting Idea Purveyors and
Media Producers after Grosso v. Miramax, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 507 (2005).
29. See infra Parts I.B, II.
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I. PATENTS, PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER,
AND THE PROPOSAL TO PATENT STORYLINES
This part first reviews the statutory requirements for protection under the
United States patent system and then presents patent attorney Andrew
Knight's proposal for protecting storylines as process patents. Specifically,
Part L.A provides an overview of the United States patent system. Part I.B
examines the current case law regarding patentable subject matter,
discussing the scope of patentable processes, as well as several doctrines
that the courts have developed to limit what inventions may be patented.
Part I.C briefly outlines commentators' concerns about the expanding scope
of patentable processes. Finally, Part I.D examines Knight's storyline
patent applications, reviews one of his applications in detail, and presents
his arguments for why storyline processes should constitute patentable
subject matter.
A. An Overview of the U.S. Patent System
To encourage inventors to create and disclose new inventions, patents
confer a limited monopoly over the subject matter of the patent.30
Specifically, a patent granted in the United States confers "the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States" for a limited term.31 Via this limited term, the U.S. patent
regime reflects an effort to balance "the need to encourage innovation and
the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any
concomitant advance." 32 The monopoly period provides a financial
incentive to make inventions public and to develop new inventions. 33 In
exchange for allowing this limited monopoly period, the public receives full
disclosure of the patented invention, the right to invent and patent
improvements to the patented invention, and an unencumbered right to copy
the patented invention after the patent expires.34
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the specific power to grant patents.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states, "The Congress shall have
Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (describing patent terms and rights).
31. Id. This limited term is usually for twenty years from the application filing date. See
id.
32. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); see also
Ben Kiemens, The Rise of the Information Processing Patent, 14 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1, 1
(2008) ("'Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to
avoid the diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten."' (quoting Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion in Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.
Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006))).
33. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem
of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1473, 1483-85
(2004).
34. See id. (describing the patent bargain and the public's rights under the patent
scheme).
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for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 35 This clause is "both a grant of
power and a limitation," reminding Congress that "the exercise of the patent
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose." 36
Beginning in 1870, Congress has used its patent clause power to enact a
series of patent acts. 37 Under the current statutory scheme, an applicant is
entitled to patent protection if his invention is adequately disclosed in the
patent application, 38 is novel 39 and nonobvious,40 and fits within one of the
four specific categories of statutorily defined subject matter.41  The
following discussion provides a brief overview of these requirements. 42
Adequate public disclosure is a central element of the patent bargain. As
a result, each application must comply with the four basic disclosure
requirements contained in 35 U.S.C. § 112: (1) enablement, (2) best mode,
(3) written description, and (4) clear claiming.43
The patent system also seeks to avoid granting patents on inventions that
do not reflect a sufficient degree of innovation over past inventions-
known as the "prior art"-to warrant a monopoly. The novelty and
nonobviousness requirements are meant to ensure that a patented invention
represents such an advance. 44 An invention is novel if it has not been
previously disclosed in the prior art.45 An invention is nonobvious if a
35. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
37. For a history of the various patent acts, see Sheldon W. Halpern et al., Fundamentals
of United States Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patent, Trademark 196-99 (2007).
Congress is currently considering sweeping amendments to the current patent scheme as part
of The Patent Reform Act of 2007. S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
(2007) (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007). For a discussion of the major revisions
contained in H.R. 1908 as passed, see Patently-O: Patent Law Blog,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/09/patent-reform-2.html (Sept. 11, 2007).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
39. Id. § 102.
40. Id. § 103.
41. Id. § 101.
42. Because Knight frames his storyline applications as processes in order to meet the
statutory subject matter requirement, Part I.B discusses statutory subject matter and
patentable processes in depth.
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Halpern et al., supra note 37, at 202-03
("[E]nablement... demands [that the specification provides] sufficient information [such
that] a person skilled in the relevant art [can] make and use the claimed invention without
'undue experimentation."'); id. at 206 ("The best mode requirement prohibits an inventor
from applying for a patent while concealing from the public a preferred embodiment .. ");
id. at 208 ( "[W]ritten description [requires the applicant] to convey with reasonable clarity
to those skilled in the art that [he] was in possession of the claimed subject matter when the
patent application was filed."); id. at 209 ("[Clear claiming requires the applicant to]
'particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]' the invention. The purpose of [this]
requirement is to put the public. . . on notice of what exactly is being claimed by the
patentee.").
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty); id. § 103 (nonobviousness).
45. See id. § 102 (listing eligible prior art). Patent claims are "anticipated" by prior art
under § 102 if "each claim limitation is disclosed, 'either expressly or inherently,' in a single
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person of skill in the relevant art could not arrive at the invention based on
information available in the prior art, including by combining elements of
different prior art.4 6 The nonobviousness requirement usually is a greater
obstacle to patentability than is novelty because an invention may be novel
but still not patentable if "it is not significantly different" than the prior
art.
47
The statutory subject matter requirements define what kinds of inventions
may be patented. Section 101 provides that a patent may be granted for
"any new48 and useful 49 process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."50 Thus, patents may
be granted for four classes of inventions: (1) machines, (2) manufactures,
(3) compositions of matter, and (4) processes. 51
As discussed below in Part I.D, Knight has drafted his storyline claims as
process claims and argues that this form of claiming renders his storylines
patentable subject matter.52 The following section traces the development
of U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Circuit jurisprudence regarding
patentable subject matter-particularly patentable processes.
prior art reference that existed before the patent applicant's date of invention." Halpern et al.,
supra note 37, at 210. Prior art references may not be combined to anticipate an invention.
Rather, a single piece of prior art must contain "'all the claimed elements... in exactly the
same situation and united in the same way to perform the identical function."' Id. at 212
(quoting Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 716, 723 n.4
(D. Del. 1982)).
46. Unlike the novelty inquiry, the examiner may combine the teachings of several prior
art references to allege obviousness. See Halpern et al., supra note 37, at 234. For an
analysis of the obviousness inquiry in view of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., see The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Leading Cases, 121
Harv. L. Rev. 185, 375 (2007).
47. Halpern et al., supra note 37, at 234 n.158 ("'An invention which has been made,
and which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be
patentable if the difference between the new thing, and what was known before is not
considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent."' (quoting P.J. Federico, Commentary on
the New Patent Act, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 161, 180-81 (1993))).
48. The "new" requirement under § 101 is separate and distinct from the novelty
requirement of § 102. See, e.g., Katharine P. Ambrose, The Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 Tenn.
L. Rev. 903, 905 (1981) ("The concepts of novelty and nonobviousness ... are only part of
what is implied by the word 'new' in the section 101 phrase 'new and useful.' The term
'new' is broader and excludes all things presumed to have always existed in the public
domain, whether or not they were recognized previously.").
49. This utility requirement helps secure a quid pro quo for society. See Halpem et al.,
supra note 37, at 232. The invention must be "capable of performing the proposed function"
even if it is not "fully operational" to satisfy § 101; a lack of utility may be demonstrated "by
a showing of total incapacity." Id. at 233.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
51. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (defining the four types of subject
matter).
52. See Knight, supra note 20, at 868-69 ("A method is a method and should be
examined as such.... There is simply no statutory or common law exempting from
patentability a useful method for producing entertainment.").
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B. Patentable Subject Matter and Patentable Processes
Processes are unique among the four types of statutory subject matter.
Machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter are physical products,
and patents protecting these tangible things provide the right to exclude
others from making and using them. 53 Process claims, on the other hand,
protect an "'act or a series of acts."' 54 Types of processes include methods
of making products as well as new methods of using products. 55 Patents
protecting processes thus provide the right to exclude others from
performing the steps of the claimed method. 56 This right to exclude is
narrower than the right to exclude afforded by a product patent because, to
infringe a process patent, the actor must perform all of the recited steps of
the method.57 If she uses an alternative method to achieve the same result,
she does not infringe. 58
To illustrate the potential breadth of patentable processes and the scope
of patent rights conveyed by a process claim, consider the following claim
excerpted from an amusing patent that recites steps for using a laser pointer
to "exercise" a cat:
1. A method of inducing aerobic exercise in an unrestrained cat
comprising the steps of:
(a) directing an intense coherent beam of invisible light produced by a
hand-held laser apparatus to produce a bright highly-focused pattern
of light at the intersection of the beam and an opaque surface, said
pattern being of visual interest to a cat; and
(b) selectively redirecting said beam out of the cat's immediate reach
to induce said cat to run and chase said beam and pattern of light
around an exercise area.
59
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
54. See Halpern et al., supra note 37, at 244 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780,
788 (1876)).
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
56. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2005) ("Because a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of which it is
comprised, the use of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the steps
recited.").
57. See, e.g., Roberts Dairy Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("It
is well established that a patent for a method or process is not infringed unless all steps or
stages of the claimed process are utilized.").
58. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 102 (D.
Mass. 2001) ("[U]nlike ... product claims, for which it does not matter how one reached the
patented result[,]... how one reaches the useful result is the very substance of a process
patent."). Depending on the final scope of Knight's claims after prosecution, one can avoid
infringing his claims by any numbers of ways. One can perform a noninfringing method by
leaving out one or several of the steps, altering the steps, or performing the steps in a
different order.
59. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (issued Aug. 22, 1995) (expired
September 17, 2007 due to failure to pay maintenance fees). The claims of this patent are
widely criticized as being obvious, but the patent has never been litigated or reexamined. See
FreePatentsOnline, List of Crazy Patents, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html (last
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If the patentees also had invented a patentable laser apparatus, they could
have claimed a method of using this special apparatus to exercise a cat (or
to do anything else). The patentees explicitly do not, however, "claim a
right to exclude others from possessing a cat, making a laser pointer, using
a laser pointer in a classroom, or even from 'directing' a laser pointer with a
cat present without subsequently 'redirecting' it.' '60 The rights granted to
the patentees are limited "to the use of the entire series of actions that make
up the recited method. ' 61 Thus, a person who uses a flashlight to perform
the claimed method does not infringe.62 Furthermore, the patentees do not
have the right to exclude the public from "discussing, communicating, or
thinking about the cat-exercising method. '
63
The rest of this section examines the law governing patentable subject
matter, including the law allowing process patent claims such as the one
discussed above. Part I.B.1 presents the statutory framework governing
patentable subject matter. Part I.B.2 traces Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit jurisprudence regarding patentable processes. Part I.B.3 discusses
several judicially created exceptions to patentable subject matter. Part I.B.4
describes two additional doctrines that courts have employed at various
times to restrict the scope of patentable processes.
1. Statutory Framework
As discussed above, the Constitution grants Congress the power to grant
patents "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 64
Accordingly, in 35 U.S.C. § 101, Congress limited the types of inventions
that are eligible for patent protection to "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof."65 In In re Nuijten, a split Federal Circuit recently
interpreted this language from § 101 when it addressed whether a claimed
electrical signal fit within one of the four categories of patentable subject
matter.66 The Nuijten majority noted that the claimed signals "are not
traditional step-by-step process claims, nor are they directed to any
apparatus for generating, receiving, processing, or storing the signals."
67
visited Apr. 19, 2008) (discussing the obviousness of the "Method of Exercising a Cat"
patent and listing other "crazy" patents).
60. Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. Rev. 317, 324-25 (2007)
(discussing the scope of the "Method of Exercising a Cat" patent).
61. Id. at 32 5.
62. Using a flashlight would not literally infringe the patent because it does not recite
using a beam of light from a flashlight instead of a laser in the claimed method; however, a
court might find infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents. See Halpem et al., supra
note 37, at 281-83.
63. Collins, supra note 60, at 325.
64. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
66. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g and reh'g en banc
denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
67. Id. at 1351 (noting that "such claims have been allowed"). The independent claim at
issue recites,
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The majority held that the claimed signals were not patentable because they
did not fall within any statutory subject matter category. 68 First, the court
held that a signal is not a process because it does not "cover an act or series
of acts."69  Second, the court held that a "propagating electromagnetic
signal is not a 'machine"' because it is not "a concrete thing, consisting of
parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices." 70 Third, the court
held that a "signal comprising a fluctuation in electric potential or in
electromagnetic fields" is not a composition of matter because it "is not a
'chemical union,' nor a gas, fluid, powder, or solid."'71 Finally, the court
held that "Nuijten's signals, standing alone, are not 'manufacture[s]' under
the meaning of that term in § 101."'72
Judge Richard Linn, in dissent, saw the case as an opportunity to
confront an ongoing controversy regarding the scope of patentable subject
matter.73 While he acknowledged the majority's "desire to draw an
exclusionary line," he cautioned that the court must be "mindful of [its]
duty to interpret the law as Congress wrote it rather than attempt 'to
preempt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with
"common sense and the public weal."' '74
Judge Linn's analysis focused on the textual requirements of § 101.75 He
suggested that "[t]he answer to this [question of permissible scope] is best
found in § 101 's textual requirements that statutory subject matter be 'new'
and 'useful,' which are limits on the four statutory categories that otherwise
encompass 'anything under the sun that is made by man."' 76 Judge Linn
analyzed both the "new" and the "useful" requirements in turn.
A signal with embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded in
accordance with a given encoding process and selected samples of the signal
representing the supplemental data, and at least one of the samples preceding the
selected samples is different from the sample corresponding to the given encoding
process.
Id.
68. Id. at 1357.
69. See id. at 1355 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court and this court have consistently
interpreted the statutory term 'process' to require action").
70. Id. at 1355-56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 1357.
72. Id. at 1356-57 (discussing definitions of "manufacture"). But see id. at 1359-63
(Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analyzing precedent and concluding that
the majority's definition of "manufacture" was erroneous).
73. See id. at 1358 ("This case presents challenging questions that go beyond the single
patent claim at issue. In determining the scope of patentable subject matter, we must
reconcile cutting-edge technologies with a statute, the language of which dates back to the
beginning of the Republic. Moreover, we decide this case against a backdrop of ongoing
controversy regarding the wisdom of software patenting and our decision in State Street
Bank....").
74. Id. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)) (disagreeing with
the majority's belief that its "holding is compelled by or consistent with precedent or the
language of the statute" and "fear[ing] that [the holding] risks further confusing an already
uncertain set of doctrines").
75. See id. at 1358-67.
76. Id. at 1358 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
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Judge Linn first distinguished the term "new" in § 101 from § 102's
"novelty" requirement. 77  He concluded that § 101 demands that an
invention be a "new" creation, rather than the discovery of a preexisting
principle. 78 For example, a scientific truth simply reveals a relationship that
has always existed and thus is not "new" in the § 101 sense, even if it may
be "novel"-i.e., previously undiscovered by man.79  The "new"
requirement thus filters out subject matter that preexists in nature and is
"part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men" that should remain "free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none."
80
Turning to the "useful" requirement, Judge Linn noted that the practical
application of a claim directed to one of several judicial exceptions to
patentable subject matter-i.e., a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or
an abstract idea 81'-usually is "too attenuated from the subject of the claim
to be 'useful.' 82 An invention satisfies this requirement if its "'currently
available form"' confers "'specific benefits."' 8 3  In other words, the
claimed invention must have a "specific and substantial utility to satisfy §
101."84
Judge Linn therefore ultimately framed the § 101 inquiry as (1) whether
the invention is a "process," "machine," "manufacture," or "composition of
77. See id. at 1363-64.
78. See id. The Supreme Court has reserved certain subject matter-laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas-from the realm of patentable subject matter. Judge
Richard Linn suggested that these judicially created exceptions are examples of subject
matter that fail § 101's "new" requirement. For a discussion of the judicial exceptions, see
infra Part I.B.3.
79. See Nuyten, 500 F.3d at 1364-65.
80. Id. at 1364 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting further that "[t]o be 'made by
man,' something must not be pre-existing in nature; it must be, literally, an invention").
81. See infra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of the judicial exceptions.
82. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1365 ("(A]lthough mathematical algorithms and similarly
abstract principles may be useful (in the casual sense of the term) in a wide variety of
contexts, their utility is too far removed from what is claimed for them to be 'useful' under §
101.").
83. Id. (quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966)).
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (indicating that "a claim to a gene sequence where the sequence has only
been shown to have 'biological activity"' does not meet this criteria)).
Part I.B.2 discusses the courts' struggles in trying to identify when a process that does not
involve a physical transformation satisfies this substantial utility. Judge Linn believes that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's "useful, concrete, and tangible result"
test, discussed in Part I.B.2.b, speaks to the "useful" requirement. See id. Judge Linn
declined to address, however, whether a process requires a physical transformation or
whether a patentable process must be "technological," reserving these "difficult questions"
for "other days and other cases." See id. at 1367 n.7 ("I express no opinion as to whether an
invention can be a 'manufacture,' or for that matter whether it can be 'useful' within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Article I, clause 8 of the Constitution, without having some
discernible effect upon the world or effecting some physical transformation.... Nor do I
express an opinion as to whether 'useful' may mean 'technological' and thereby require
either a result or an art that is technological in character." (discussing In re Comiskey, 499
F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385 (B.P.A.I.
2005))).
30112008]
FORDHA M LA W RE VIE W
matter" and (2) whether it is "new" and "useful. '85  Applying this
framework, he concluded that the claimed signal was both "new" and
"useful." '86 The signal is "new" because it is "man-made," "artificial in
character," and not "natural or pre-existing." 87 Although the claimed signal
requires "encoding" using transformations that apply laws of mathematics
and physics, it recites an application and does not preempt any law of
mathematics or physics. 88 Moreover, the signal is "useful" in "a direct and
specific way" because the invention "is directed to encoding and
communicating data, and that is precisely what the signal does." 89
Accordingly, Judge Linn concluded that the claimed signal was patentable
subject matter. 90
The Nuijten court's split decision highlights the difficulty that courts
have faced in construing the boundaries of the four categories of statutory
subject matter based on the language of § 101. 9 1 The Supreme Court,
interpreting the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
asserted that the statute's history supports a broad construction because
"Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the
sun that is made by man."' 92 The Court cautioned, however, that this does
not "suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery." 93
2. The Scope of Patentable Processes
Having discussed the basic requirements of § 101 relating to patentable
subject matter in the previous section, this section discusses judicial tests
for identifying patentable processes specifically. As highlighted by the
"Method of Exercising a Cat" patent discussed above, nearly any endeavor
can be claimed as a process by stating the action as a series of steps;
however, this does not mean that every process satisfies the constitutional
and statutory subject matter requirements. 94 This section discusses the
scope of the process category of patentable subject matter.95
85. Id. at 1367 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1368.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1369. Judge Linn analogized his conclusion in Nuijten with the Supreme
Court's decision to allow certain claims in O'Reilly v. Morse. See id. at 1368-69 (citing
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 111-12 (1853)). For further discussion of Morse,
see infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
91. Indeed, Judge Linn would have held that the claimed signals were manufactures,
whereas the majority held that the claimed signals were not manufactures. See id. at 1359.
92. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("The holding that the discovery
of [Benson's] method could not be patented as a 'process' forecloses a purely literal reading
of§ 101.").
95. There are differing approaches to analyzing the scope of statutory processes. For
example, one approach concludes that the judicial exclusions discussed in Part I.B.3
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The difficulties in identifying patentable processes begins with the
statute, which somewhat circularly defines the term "process" as a "process,
art or method," including "a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material. '96 Not surprisingly,
courts have long experienced difficulties in defining the boundaries of
patentable processes. 97 Various Supreme Court interpretations include "a
method of doing a thing," 98 "a mode of treatment of certain materials to
produce a given result," 99 "some practical method or means of producing a
beneficial result or effect,"100 and "transform[ation] and reduc[tion] to a
different state or thing." 10 1 The Court's guidance is particularly lacking
with regard to processes that involve no "physical manipulations of
physical items." 10 2 As a result, subject matter such as business methods,
computer-related art, and tax methods have tested and expanded the bounds
of patentable subject matter because the lower courts have struggled to
develop a coherent test for identifying patentable processes that do not
involve a physical transformation.10 3 The following sections trace the
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit jurisprudence regarding patentable
processes, particularly processes that do not involve physical
transformations. 10 4
technically refer to subject matter that is not within § 101 and thus cannot be a process.
Alternatively, some case law suggests that the judicial exceptions refer to subject matter that
is within § 101 processes but for their special condition as exceptions. Both approaches
should yield the same result.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2000).
97. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev.
1139, 1144 (1999).
98. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S 366, 383 (1909).
99. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
100. Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1853).
101. Chochrane, 94 U.S. at 788.
102. Richard S. Gruner, In Search of the Undiscovered Country: The Challenge of
Describing Patentable Subject Matter, 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 395, 400
(2007).
103. For examples of these types of patents, see infra notes 277-83 and accompanying
text.
104. Norman D. McClaskey offers a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's statutory
process doctrine prior to 1970. Norman D. McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its
Origin, Legal Basis, and Scope, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1148, 1150-62 (1970) (discussing Smith v.
Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909);
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1898); Risdon Iron & Locomotive
Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68 (1895); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888);
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876); Jacobs
v. Baker, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 295 (1869); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853);
Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935)). McClaskey concludes that the Supreme Court's
definition of statutory process is "[a]ny process that produces useful, predictable results and
which may be described with definiteness." Id. at 1162.
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a. Supreme Court Tests for Inventions That Apply Algorithms
Gottschalk v. Benson1°5 marked the Supreme Court's first foray into an
emerging software field as it considered whether computer-related methods
are patentable subject matter. 106 The claims were not limited to physical
manipulations in a specific device or apparatus. 107 Thus, "the Court was
required to consider whether developers of innovative computer
programming methods or information processing advances that used
nonphysical means to achieve useful results could obtain patents for these
types of advances in the absence of additional physical device features or
processes that implemented the advances."' 08
The unanimous Court cited several disjointed reasons for rejecting the
application. The Court first recited the historical requirement that
patentability of "a process claim that does not include particular machines"
requires "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing." ' 10 9  But the Court failed to address whether this precedent
applied. 10 Instead, it expressed concern that allowing the patent would
have the practical effect of granting a patent on a mere idea-a
mathematical algorithm. "'
The Court revisited the scope of patentable processes in Parker v.
Flook 1 12 The patent applicant argued that "a process [that] implements a
principle in some specific fashion . . . automatically falls within the
patentable subject matter of § 101 [because it is a process,] and the
substantive patentability of the particular process can then be determined by
105. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
106. The applicants sought to patent a method for converting information from one
computer-readable format (binary-coded decimal numerals) into another computer-readable
format (pure binary numerals). See id. at 64.
107. Id. at 64 (noting that "[t]he claims were not limited to any particular art or
technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use" and
"cover[ed] any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of any
type").
108. Gruner, supra note 102, at 402.
109. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. Commentators have suggested that some of the method
claims meet this requirement. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 97, at 1149 ("Arguably, at least
those claims reciting computer implementation of the numerical conversion method did
involve some sort of physical conversion.").
110. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (noting that prior precedent suggested that "a process
patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change
articles or materials to a 'different state or thing,"' but clarifying that "[w]e do not hold that
no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents").
111. Id. at 71-72 ("The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment
below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."). The Court did not clarify
whether including developed and clearly described engineering details in the specification
would have sufficiently limited the method claims to be patentable subject matter.
112. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The inventor in Flook sought to patent a method for updating
the value of an alarm limit using a mathematic formula. See id. at 596-98.
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the conditions of §§ 102 and 103."113 The Court discarded the applicant's
argument and explained that some processes are not statutory subject
matter, noting that "[t]he rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be
patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes,
but rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not the kind
of 'discoveries' that the statute was enacted to protect."' 14
The Court ruled on the merits "that the discovery of a novel and useful
mathematical formula may not be patented""15 but distinguished the
invention in Flook from that of Benson as a "useful, though conventional,
post-solution application[] of [a mathematical] formula.""l 6 The Court
stated that "a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of
nature or a mathematical algorithm,"' 1 7 but it held that the claimed process
was not patentable because the postsolution step was "conventional or
obvious."1 8 Although the Court did not articulate what features would be
needed to render patentable the use of the mathematical algorithm, the
Court suggested that "the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application." 119
The Court confronted the issue of defining statutory processes a final
time in Diamond v. Diehr.120 As in Flook, the advancement that the Diehr
method offered was the use of a mathematical algorithm, 121 but the Court
reached the opposite conclusion regarding its patentability. 122 Quoting
113. Id. at 593. But see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) ("A rejection on [§
102 or § 103] grounds does not affect the determination that respondents' claims recited
subject matter which was eligible for patent protection under § 101," although "it may later
be determined that the respondents' process is not deserving of patent protection because it
fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under §
103.").
114. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
115. Id. at 585.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 590.
118. Id. ("The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious
in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over
substance."). The Court further argued, "A competent draftsman could attach some form of
post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would
not have [become patentable just] because a patent application contained a final step
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying
techniques." Id.
119. Id. at 594.
120. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The Court analyzed the statutory definition of the word
"process" in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 181-84. The Court noted that, historically, "'[it is for
the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing a beneficial
result or effect, that a [process] patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself. It is
when the term process is used to represent the means or method of producing a result that it
is patentable ... ' Id. at 184 n.7 (quoting Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-
68 (1854)).
121. Id. at 177. The process at issue in Diehr used a computer to repeatedly calculate an
algorithm, the Arrhenius equation, to determine the optimal cure time for "a process for
molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products." Id.
122. In contrast to Benson and Flook, the Court noted that the inventors "do not seek to
patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing
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Cochrane v. Deener, the Court stated, "'A process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing." ' 12 3  Because processes for curing rubber have
"historically been eligible to receive [patent] protection" and the "claims
describe in detail a step-by-step method for accomplishing such," the Court
held that the method constituted patentable subject matter under § 101
despite its use of a mathematical equation. 124
A broad reading of Diehr suggests that a process that applies an abstract
idea or algorithm is patentable if the process as a whole performs a function
"which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing)."1 25 A reading limited to the
facts suggests that "a physical manipulation of a functionally significant
aspect of a process is sufficient to transform [the application of a
mathematical equation] into a patentable advance."' 126
The Court did not articulate what "minimum physical features or
relationships to physical surrounds ... are necessary to place an advance
within the range of patentable subject matter."' 27 The Court also did not
address "whether a statutory process must effect a physical
transformation-and if so, exactly what this means--or whether the
quotation from Cochrane is merely illustrative of one type of statutory
process."' 128 The following section describes the lower courts' difficulties
delineating the boundary of patentable processes due to this "gap" in
Supreme Court guidance. 129
b. The Federal Circuit's Useful, Concrete, and Tangible
Result Test for Patentable Processes
The Federal Circuit articulated a test for identifying patentable processes
in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.130
synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation,
but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation [except in conjunction with] their
claimed process." Id. at 187.
123. Id. at 183 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877)).
124. Id. at 184-85.
125. Id. at 192-93.
126. Gruner, supra note 102, at 408.
127. Id.
128. Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 855, 864-65 (2007). For example, the Diehr Court indicated that there are certain
processes that "the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an
article to a different state or thing)"; however, the Court's use of"e.g.," indicates that it was
not explicitly limiting patentable processes to only those that transform or reduce an article
to a different state or thing. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
129. See Gruner, supra note 102, at 408.
130. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that the computer-implemented invention was patentable
because it "is not a disembodied mathematical concept" but rather a specific machine that
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According to the court, "The question of whether a claim encompasses
statutory subject matter should... [focus] on the essential characteristics of
the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.' 3 1  Applying the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Federal Circuit
explained that "[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by
showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts
or truths that are not 'useful.""'132
The court held on the merits that the claimed machine programmed with
the described software produced a "'useful, concrete, and tangible result'-
a final share price."' 133 The court further articulated that producing a useful,
concrete, and tangible result renders "[an invention] statutory subject
matter, even if the useful result is expressed in numbers, such as price,
profit, percentage, cost, or loss." 134
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed and clarified the "useful, concrete, and
tangible result" test in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. 135 Excel
argued that "method claims containing mathematical algorithms are
patentable subject matter only if there is a 'physical transformation' or
conversion of subject matter from one state into another."' 36 Interpreting
Diehr, the Federal Circuit held that "physical transformation" is not "an
invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical
algorithm may bring about a useful application."' 137 Because the invention
"as a whole, produces a tangible, useful, result," the Federal Circuit held
that "the claims. .. fall comfortably within the broad scope of patentable
subject matter under § 101.1"138
produces "a useful, concrete, and tangible result"). Professor John R. Thomas has noted that
reconciling Alappat with Benson is difficult. See Thomas, supra note 97, at 1154.
The disputed claims in State Street involved a data processing system used to implement a
financial investment structure and business method. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371-72.
131. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (noting that "[s]ection 101 specifies that statutory
subject matter must also satisfy the other 'conditions and requirements' of Title 35, including
novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice").
132. Id. at 1373.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1375.
135. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
136. Id. at 1358 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981)).
137. Id. at 1358-59 ("As the Supreme Court itself noted, 'when [a claimed invention] is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of §
101.' The 'e.g.' signal denotes an example, not an exclusive requirement." (citing Diehr, 450
U.S. at 192)).
138. Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit remanded the case so the district court could further
consider the validity of the claims. Id. ("[W]e note that the ultimate validity of these claims
depends upon their satisfying the other requirements for patentability such as those set forth
in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112."). The district court subsequently held the patent invalid
and unenforceable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns,
Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1865 (D. Del. 1999).
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c. The Supreme Court's Doubts Regarding the Federal Circuit's Useful,
Concrete, and Tangible Result Test
In 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of
American Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.139 Commentators
hoped that the Court would use this case as an opportunity to clarify its
jurisprudence regarding patentable subject matter. 140 Although the parties
presented oral argument on this question in 2006, the Court ultimately
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 141 Justice Stephen G. Breyer,
however, in a dissent joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David H.
Souter, discussed how he would have analyzed the merits of the case. 142
Significantly, he questioned the Federal Circuit's patentable subject matter
standards: "[State Street] does say that a process is patentable if it produces
a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result.' But this Court has never made
such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances
where this Court has held the contrary."' 143 Despite his criticism, Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion did not provide any further guidance about the
proper standard for patentable processes.
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens may not be the only members of the
Court who are concerned about the Federal Circuit's patentable subject
matter jurisprudence. Earlier in the same term, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, in a concurrence joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens,
expressed concern about "the burgeoning number of patents over business
methods," noting their "potential vagueness and suspect validity.' ' 144 Given
these remarks by two justices (with the support of two more), commentators
139. 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2925 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (2006).
140. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 128, at 872 ("[Plerhaps the most anticipated
development in the law of patent eligibility in recent years turned out to be something of a
non-event.").
141. LabCorp., 126 S. Ct. at 2921. LabCorp did not raise the 35 U.S.C § 101 objection in
the lower courts, and the Federal Circuit did not directly consider this issue so the Court
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. See id. at 2925; see generally Sue Ann Mota,
What Is Patentable Subject Matter? The Supreme Court Dismissed LabCorp v. Metabolite
Laboratories, But the Issue Is Not Going Away, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 181, 185-92
(2007) (reviewing the district court's, the Federal Circuit's, and the Supreme Court's
decisions in LabCorp).
142. LabCorp., 126 S. Ct. at 2921-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2928 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Justice Stephen G. Breyer notes,
The Court, for example, has invalidated a claim to the use of electromagnetic
current for transmitting messages over long distances even though it produces a
result that seems 'useful, concrete, and tangible.' Similarly the Court has
invalidated a patent setting forth a system for triggering alarm limits in connection
with catalytic conversion despite a similar utility, concreteness, and tangibility.
And the Court has invalidated a patent setting forth a process that transforms, for
computer-programming purposes, decimal figures into binary figures-even
though the result would seem useful, concrete, and at least arguably (within the
computer's wiring system) tangible.
Id. (discussing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), respectively).
144. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006).
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have suggested that the Supreme Court likely will reconsider the Federal
Circuit's patentable subject matter standards in the near future. 145
d. The Federal Circuit's Responses to Justice Breyer's Admonishment
After LabCorp, the Federal Circuit has addressed the issue of patentable
subject matter in two cases, In re Comiskey 146 and In re Nuijten.147
Professor Jeanne Fromer suggests, "Perhaps prompted by [Justice Breyer's]
criticism of State Street's breadth, the Federal Circuit... reined in
patentable subject matter with regard to business method patents in In re
Comiskey," turning sharply, at least in result, off the path for patentable
subject matter it had partially paved and then followed for decades. 148
The contested business method claims in Comiskey involved a method of
conducting mandatory arbitration. 149 Most of the claims were not machine
implemented, and none of the claims caused a transformation of
materials. 150 Emphasizing that "not every 'process' is patentable,"'15 1 the
court noted that the Supreme Court has allowed process patents reciting
145. See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 102, at 420; Mota, supra note 141, at 192.
146. 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
147. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
148. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Panel I: The Business Method Patent and the Patent Reform
Act of 2007: Can the Law Keep Pace with Technology?, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &
Ent. L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
149. Claim 1 of patent application No. 09/461,742 recites,
A method for mandatory arbitration resolution regarding one or more unilateral
documents comprising the steps of:
enrolling a person and one or more unilateral documents associated with the
person in a mandatory arbitration system at a time prior to or as of the time of
creation of or execution of the one or more unilateral documents;
incorporating arbitration language, that is specific to the enrolled person, in
the previously enrolled unilateral document wherein the arbitration language
provides that any contested issue related to the unilateral document must be
presented to the mandatory arbitration system, in which the person and the
one or more unilateral documents are enrolled, for binding arbitration wherein
the contested issue comprises one or more of a challenge to the documents,
interpretation of the documents, interpretation or application of terms of the
documents and execution of the documents or terms of the documents;
requiring a complainant to submit a request for arbitration resolution to the
mandatory arbitration system wherein the request is directed to the contested
issue related to the unilateral document containing the arbitration language;
conducting arbitration resolution for the contested issue related to the
unilateral document in response to the request for arbitration resolution;
providing support to the arbitration; and
determining an award or a decision for the contested issue related to the
unilateral document in accordance with the incorporated arbitration language,
wherein the award or the decision is final and binding with respect to the
complainant.
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1368 n.1 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 09/461,742).
150. Id. at 1371 ("[The claims] neither were tied to a particular machine nor operated to
change materials to a different state or thing.").
151. Id. at 1375-76 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)) (noting that it is
incorrect to assume "that if a process application implements a principle in some specific
fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of § 101").
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algorithms or abstract concepts in claims directed to "industrial
processes."' 152 Specifically, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only two
instances in which such a method may qualify as a section 101 process:
when the process 'either [1] was tied to a particular apparatus' or [2]
operated to change materials to a 'different state or thing."' 153 The court
concluded that "a [process] claim reciting an algorithm or abstract idea can
state statutory subject matter only if [the process] is embodied in, operates
on, transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory subject
matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."'154 Using
this analysis, the court held that Comiskey's non-machine-implemented
process claims were not patentable subject matter without considering
whether the claimed method produced a useful, concrete, and tangible
result. 155
While the scope of patentable processes seemed to be predictably
expanding over the past decades, the Federal Circuit's reaction to LabCorp
has generated uncertainty in this area of the law. Comiskey and the split
decision in Nuijten "illustrate[] ongoing debate in the Federal Circuit over
the fundamental issue of patentable subject matter"156-a debate that will
be further addressed by the Federal Circuit in the upcoming In re Bilski en
banc rehearing. 157 While Andrew Knight filed his storyline applications in
a State Street world, the standard under which his applications will be
examined is in flux.
3. Judicially Created Exceptions to Patentable Subject Matter
While the Chakrabarty Court expressed that the categories of patentable
subject matter should be interpreted broadly, the Supreme Court has
152. Id. at 1376.
153. Id. (citing Supplemental Letter Brief of Appellee at 3, Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365
(No. 2006-1286)). This seems inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's rationale in AT&T
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (suggesting
that a process that produces a transformation is an example of a patentable process but such a
transformation is not necessarily a requirement).
The Federal Circuit reconciled Alappat, State Street, and AT&T by emphasizing that the
claimed inventions in these prior cases all involved the use of a machine-a computer. See
Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1377 n.14.
154. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1376.
155. On the facts, the court noted that many of the disputed claims "do not require a
machine, and ... do not describe a process of manufacture or a process for the alteration of a
composition of matter." Id. at 1379. The court further determined that two of the
independent claims, "under the broadest reasonable interpretation, could require the use of a
computer as part of Comiskey's arbitration system." Id. The court held that these claims did
recite statutory subject matter, and it remanded to the Patent Office to determine whether the
machine-associated claims satisfy other requirements for patentability, including
nonobviousness. Id. at 1380-81. The court suggested that the claims may not satisfy the
other statutory requirements. Id. at 1380 ("The routine addition of modem electronics to an
otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness.").
156. Lewis R. Clayton, Two Patentability Rulings, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 12, 2007, at 2.
157. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing the upcoming rehearing
in Bilski).
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repeatedly held, consistent with Judge Linn's analysis in Nuiten, that "[t]he
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas [are] not patentable"
because they are "free to all men" and "reserved exclusively to none."
158
By way of example, the Court indicated that newly discovered mineral or
plant species are not patentable because these are natural phenomena, 159 as
are things like "the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the qualities of
metals."' 160 Examples of laws of nature include Sir Isaac Newton's law of
gravity and Albert Einstein's mass-energy equation, 161 while abstract ideas
include "novel and useful mathematical formula[el."'1 62
Although the Court has made it clear that these examples constitute
judicially created exceptions to patentable subject matter, the Court has
been neither precise in its application of this doctrine nor clear in
articulating its reasoning when it invokes the doctrine.' 63 Yet the abstract
idea exception, at least, may be increasingly relevant for certain types of
process inventions that seek to make abstract intellectual concepts
sufficiently concrete to be described in a patent application. 164 Although
the Court has not consistently discussed this concept under the specific
rubric of abstract ideas, this section discusses cases in which the courts'
treatment of the patentable subject matter issue appears to invoke the
Supreme Court's prohibition against patenting abstract ideas.
The courts have struggled to define when a general principle is
sufficiently abstract to warrant exclusion from the realm of patentable
subject matter. 165 The landmark case on the issue of excluding principles
from patent protection is O'Reilly v. Morse.166 The Court upheld Samuel
Morse's claims relating to a telegraph apparatus and a system of transmitted
type and signs using electromagnetism, but scrutinized a more abstract
158. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
175 (1852)).
159. See id.
160. FunkBros., 333 U.S. at 130.
161. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
162. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585.
163. See supra Part I.B.3.
164. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2926 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "many 'process' patents seek to make abstract
intellectual concepts workably concrete").
165. For example, in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court held that "a principle is not patentable"
because "in the abstract, [it] is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive" which
"cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right." 55 U.S. (14
How.) 156, 174-75 (1852). The dissent agreed that mere principles could not be patented,
but argued that if the invention employs a principle to produce a new and useful effect or
result, the inventor should be entitled to protection against all other modes of applying that
principle. See id. at 180-81 (Nelson, J., dissenting). While the justices disagreed on the
scope of exclusion, they agreed that "mere principles" could not be the subject of a patent.
166. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
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claim. 167 Specifically, the Court held that claim 8, which claimed any use
of electromagnetism to transmit characters without being limited to the
machines disclosed in Morse's specification, was invalid. 168 The Court
expressed concern that allowing such a broad claim would preempt
subsequent inventors' ability to develop other electromagnetism-based
technologies for transmitting messages using different methods or machines
than those used by Morse. 169
The Court reversed course in the Telephone Cases, however, when it
definitively addressed the issue of whether electricity could be patentable
subject matter.' 70 Alexander Graham Bell's patent broadly claimed a
method of and an apparatus for telegraphically transmitting sound using
electrical vibrations. 171 The Court began its analysis by characterizing its
holding in Morse, noting that the use of electromagnetism separate from a
particular process described in the patent application is not patentable
subject matter but that the use of electromagnetism in connection with a
specific process is patentable subject matter. 172 The Court stated that unlike
Morse, who claimed magnetism as a motive power without regard to
process, 173 Bell's "art consist[ed] in so controlling the force as to make it
accomplish the purpose" of transmitting speech.' 74 It then concluded that
Bell's claims reciting a method of using electricity to transmit speech were
patentable subject matter even if the method was not tied to a specific
apparatus. 17 5
Over the years, courts have particularly struggled with how to treat
process patents that cover abstract instructions or software for running
electronic equipment. 176 As discussed above, the Benson Court expressed
concern that allowing software claims would have the practical effect of
167. See id. at 84-86 (listing the claims); id. at 112 ("We perceive no well-founded
objection to the description which is given of the whole invention and its separate parts, nor
to his right to a patent for the first seven inventions set forth in the specification of his
claims. The difficulty arises on the eighth.").
168. Id. at 113. Claim 8 recites,
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
electro-magnetism, however developed for making or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power
of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. at 112.
169. Id. at 113. The Court also suggested that claim 8 fails the enablement and other
disclosure requirements. Id. at 117 ("[F]or the method or process thus discovered, he is
entitled to a patent. But he has not discovered that the electro-magnetic current, used as
motive power, in any other method, and with any other combination, will do as well.").
170. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
171. Id. at 531.
172. Id. at 534.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 532.
175. Id. at 537-39.
176. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing Benson, Flook, Diehr, State Street, and AT&T).
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granting a patent on a mere idea-in that case, a mathematical algorithm.' 77
In Diehr, the Court determined that processes applying mathematical
algorithms may be patentable subject matter, 178 and the Federal Circuit
explained in State Street that "[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are
identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting
disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful."" ' 179 State Street paved
the way for a growing tolerance for increasingly abstract processes, such as
business methods, which have "useful" applications. 180
Returning to the electrical signal at issue in Nuijten, Judge Linn
addressed in his dissent whether such a signal falls within the judicial
exception for abstract ideas. 18 1 He explained what he believed is at the core
of the judicial exclusion of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas from patentable subject matter:
[S]uch phenomena "are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none .... If there is to be invention from such a discovery,
it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end."... Certain innovations, no matter how new to human thought, are
not the type of technological invention to which Congress has extended
patent protection, but instead are considered to be abstract truths that were
not "made by man." "The underlying notion is that a scientific
principle ... reveals a relationship that has always existed."1 82
Judge Linn concluded that subject matter that falls within the judicial
exceptions is not "new" in the § 101 sense. He also concluded that the
practical application of a claim directed to a judicial exception-laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas-is usually too attenuated
from the subject of the claim to be "useful" in the § 101 sense. 183
Judge Linn also clarified why the algorithm claims in Benson were
unpatentable abstract ideas that were not "new" whereas those in State
Street were patentable subject matter. 184 He suggested that the method in
Benson was "deemed to be unpatentably abstract [because] the claims
attempted to monopolize a timeless mathematical relationship among
integers, even if the particular representations of the integers may have been
177. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
178. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184-87 (1981) ("[A]n application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.").
179. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
180. See infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of
patentable processes after State Street).
181. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1363-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
182. Id. at 1364 (second and fourth alterations in original).
183. Id. at 1365 ("[A]lthough mathematical algorithms and similarly abstract principles
may be useful (in the casual sense of the term) in a wide variety of contexts, their utility is
too far removed from what is claimed for them to be 'useful' under § 101.").
184. Id. at 1364-67.
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new to computer science." 185 In contrast, the invention in State Street did
not "represent[] principles that too closely reflected the laws of mathematics
and nature to be 'new"' and "achieved real-world results with sufficient
directness and specificity to be 'useful' as that term is used in § 101. ' 186
While the courts have not clearly defined the boundaries of the judicial
exceptions, particularly abstract ideas, they regularly invoke this doctrine to
reserve subject matter to the public domain. As applicants have begun to
seek patents on nontraditional and increasingly abstract processes that do
not involve physical transformations, the courts likely will continue to
define the boundaries of judicially excluded subject matter.
4. Other Doctrines Employed by Courts to Limit
the Scope of Patentable Processes
In addition to the judicial exceptions noted above in Part I.B.3, the courts
have, at various times, held certain subject matter to be unpatentable per
se. 187 Specifically, courts have invoked the mental steps doctrine, the
technological arts doctrine, the business methods exception,' 88 and the
185. Id. at 1364-65. The Benson court worried that the software claims in question were
"so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [algorithm]," in
effect allowing "a patent on the algorithm itself." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 72
(1972); see supra notes 105-11 (discussing Benson).
186. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1367.
187. See Thomas, supra note 97, at 1145 (discussing limiting doctrines).
188. In 1908, dicta in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d
Cir. 1908), spawned the "business method" exception. See Matthew A. Melone, The
Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently Unnecessary Development, 5 DePaul Bus. & Com.
L.J. 437, 450 (2007). This bar against business method patents grew from the prohibition
against patenting abstract principles. The Federal Circuit laid to rest the "ill-conceived"
business methods exception in State Street. Cotter, supra note 128, at 867-68 ("Despite
widespread belief that case law dating back to the nineteenth century had established that
business methods were unpatentable, neither the Federal Circuit nor its predecessor Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals had ever specifically invoked that exception so as to render an
invention unpatentable."). The court indicated that "[w]hether the claims are directed to
subject matter within § 101 should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter does
'business' instead of something else." State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d, 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
While business methods have been readily patented since State Street, the recent
onslaught of patents claiming tax planning techniques, which the patent office currently
examines as any other process claims, has been quite controversial. See generally William A.
Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to this Judicial
Invention?, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 229 (2007) (arguing that tax strategy patents are unnecessary and
suggesting that Congress should limit the damages available to tax strategy patent holders);
Melone, supra (criticizing the granting of tax strategy patents and advocating a categorical
exception to subject matter eligibility). As the first lawsuit involving a tax planning patent
settled, the courts have yet to review this type of business method patent. See Consent Final
Judgment Regarding Settlement Agreement, Wealth Transfer Group v. Rowe, No. 06 Civ.
00024 (D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2007). Congress may resolve the issue as the patent reform bills
currently pending in the House and Senate both propose introducing language into 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 stipulating that "[a] patent may not be obtained for a tax planning invention." See The
Patent Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007));
see also supra note 37 (discussing the pending patent reform bills).
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printed matter doctrine' 89 to reject certain subject matter. As Professor
Thomas Cotter has noted, however, "doctrines that courts once employed to
exclude .. . inventions from patent eligibility have in recent years been
narrowed or jettisoned altogether."' 190 The following sections discuss the
development and constriction of two of these doctrines, the mental steps
doctrine and the technological arts requirement.
a. The Mental Steps Doctrine
Courts have used the mental steps doctrine to deny patent protection to
inventions that require the use of human intellect, that contain steps that
cover activities that take place in the human mind, or that may be performed
by a human. 191 Prior to the mental steps doctrine, courts often held that
patents could not be issued for processes "involving variables that made the
results of the application of the process unpredictable."' 192 Courts also
recognized the difficulty in "describing exactly the steps of a process that
required subjective judgments on the part of a human operator." 193 Patent
applications containing these defects failed to satisfy § 112.194
The Patent Office Board of Appeals first articulated a version of the
mental steps doctrine in Ex parte Read.195 The disputed claim recited a
method of determining the speed of a vehicle using two logarithmic
scales. 196 To perform the method, the operator needed to correlate two
readings, although the operator's role was mainly manipulative and only
required routine, nonsubjective mental activity. 197 Nonetheless, the board
rejected the claim because it involved a "purely ... mental act."198 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted this "purely mental
act" standard for application of the mental steps doctrine in Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.199 The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the precursor to the Federal Circuit, also adopted this "purely
mental act" standard in In re Heritage.20 0 This line of cases, none of which
cites any of the seminal Supreme Court cases regarding patentable subject
189. For a discussion of the printed matter doctrine, see Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech,
79 Tex. L. Rev. 99, 141-45 (2000).
190. Cotter, supra note 128, at 859-60 & n.15.
191. See, e.g., McClaskey, supra note 104, at 1148.
192. Ambrose, supra note 48, at 906-07 & n. 18 (listing cases).
193. Id. at 906-07 & n.19 (listing cases).
194. See id. at 905-07.
195. 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 446 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1943).
196. See id. at 446-47.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 447. The Patent Office Board of Appeals applied similar reasoning to reject
the claims in Ex parte Toth, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 131, 132 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1944)
(rejecting claims with "determining" and "correcting" steps).
199. 146 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1944).
200. 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945).
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matter, appears to hold that any human activity undertaken to perform a
process renders the claim nonstatutory subject matter.201
A second line of cases applies the mental steps doctrine to reject claims
that rely on interpretive human judgments or emotions. 20 2 For example, in
Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of America, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that a method of "combining sound and light for
aesthetic expression" was not patentable subject matter where "[w]hat is
done in carrying the method into effect [is] determined by the aesthetic and
emotional reaction of the individual [performing the method], and such
reactions may differ with different individuals." 20 3 In these cases, the
courts seem concerned about the unpredictable results produced by methods
that depend on human emotions or subjective judgment. 204
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals greatly narrowed the mental
steps doctrine in In re Musgrave,20 5 while simultaneously articulating a
separate technological arts requirement. The court dismissed the notion that
the law "requires all steps of a statutory 'process' to be physical acts
applied to physical things," noting that this misconstruction originated from
dictum that was inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court opinions. 206
The court held:
We cannot agree... that these claims... are directed to non-statutory
processes merely because some or all the steps therein can also be carried
out in or with the aid of the human mind or because it may be necessary
for one performing the processes to think. All that is necessary, in our
view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory "process" within
35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of
"useful arts." 207
After Musgrave, the courts essentially stopped invoking the mental steps
doctrine to reject process claims. The Comiskey court, however, revived the
mental steps doctrine in its rejection of claims regarding a process for
conducting arbitration. Suggesting that Benson narrowed the scope of
201. This seems inconsistent with Morse and the Telephone Cases. Both of these cases
concerned patents that contained allowable process claims even though the claims required a
human operator.
202. See, e.g., Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of Am., 54 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1931); Johnson v.
Duquesne Light Co., 29 F.2d 784 (W.D. Pa. 1928); Exparte Mayne, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 342
(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942).
203. Greenewalt, 54 F.2d at 196.
204. See, e.g., id.
205. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
206. Id. at 893 (discussing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876)) (noting that this
erroneous premise arose from dictum in Cochrane that is inconsistent with later Supreme
Court opinions).
207. Id. The court also indicated that the claims "must also comply with all the other
provisions of the statute, including definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112. A step requiring the
exercise of subjective judgment without restriction might be objectionable as rendering a
claim indefinite, but this would provide no statutory basis for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §
101." Id.; accord Ambrose, supra note 48, at 917 (arguing that the mental steps doctrine
should not be used in determining statutory subject matter but may be invoked under § 112).
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Musgrave's interpretation of the mental steps doctrine, the Comiskey court
declared that "mental processes--or processes of human thinking-
standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application. 208
The court stated that many of Comiskey's claims, which comprise the steps
of "conducting arbitration resolution" and "determining an award," "claim
the mental process of resolving a legal dispute between two parties by the
decision of a human arbitrator" and "seek to patent the use of human
intelligence in and of itself."'209 Because these claims involved a practical
application of a mental process that neither is tied to a machine nor
produces a transformation, the court held that the claims did not constitute
patentable subject matter under § 101.210
Confusingly, the court further determined that two of the independent
claims may require the use of a computer as part of the claimed arbitration
system.2 11 But Comiskey's machine-free arbitration method claims and the
arbitration method claims that use a computer for managing documents and
providing other support both require the arbitrator to "determine an award"
as part of the claimed method.212 Thus, both types of claims implicate a
mental step. Yet the court held that the machine-associated claims
nevertheless recite statutory subject matter.213  The Comiskey court's
convoluted application of the mental steps doctrine and its implementation
of a machine requirement has caused the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) much confusion, as discussed in the following section.
b. The Technological Arts Requirement
After Musgrave, examiners applied and courts upheld a technological arts
requirement as an accepted requirement for patentability. 214 In 2005, the
USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences renounced the
technological arts test in Ex parte Lundgren.215 Unlike many business
method claims, a computer or other machine was not needed to perform the
208. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 n. 11, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("In Benson, the
Supreme Court reversed a decision by our predecessor court that had, in turn, relied on
earlier decisions, such as Application of Musgrave,.. . suggesting that a process of human
thinking in and of itself could be patentable.").
209. Id. at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1379-80.
213. Id. at 1380. The court suggests that the claims may not satisfy the other statutory
requirements. Id. ("The routine addition of modem electronics to an otherwise unpatentable
invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness.").
214. See, e.g., In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The inventor sought to patent
"a method of operating a digital computer to translate from a source natural language, e.g.,
Russian, to a target natural language, e.g., English." Id. at 874. The examiner rejected the
claims because "a computerized method of translating is not.. . in the 'technological arts,"'
but rather was a "'liberal art."' Id. at 877 (quoting the examiner's rejection). The court
reversed and held that such an invention was within the technological arts because it was a
method of operating a machine. See id.
215. 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385 (B.P.A.I. 2005).
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claimed method. The majority held that "there is currently no judicially
recognized separate 'technological arts' test to determine patent eligible
subject matter under § 101 [and w]e decline to create one." 216  In a
concurring opinion, Administrative Patent Judge Lee Barrett, also
concluding that there is no separate technological arts requirement, further
suggested that a such a test "would be very difficult to apply since what
constitutes 'technology' can always be debated and because some things,
which may not seem 'technological' in nature, clearly fall within the § 101
categories (e.g., a board game is a 'manufacture' and a food product can be
a 'manufacture' or a 'composition of matter'). '217 Administrative Patent
Judge Jerry Smith's dissent, however, argued that the technological arts
standard is a permissible limitation on the scope of the patent statute
because it merely is a modem interpretation of the constitutional mandate to
promote the "useful arts." 218
While the Comiskey court did not articulate a technological arts
requirement, the court held that claims encompassing mental steps are
patentable subject matter if they also involve a machine.219 The Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences is now struggling to apply Comiskey,
issuing § 101 rejections for any process that recites a step that could
potentially be performed mentally, even if subjective judgment is not
required, if the claimed process does not explicitly require a machine. 220
216. Id. at 1388. The Lundgren court opined that "[w]e do not view the court's statement
in Musgrave in regard to the technological arts to have created a separate 'technological arts'
test in determining whether a process is statutory subject matter." Id. at 1387.
217. Id. at 1426 (Barrett, J., concurring). Administrative Patent Judge Lee Barrett's
opinion contained an extensive discussion of statutory subject matter in view of judicial
precedents and nonjudicial authority. While he argued that a technological arts test was
unworkable and irreconcilable with controlling authority, he proposed that "non-machine-
implemented process claims" such as the claimed method should not be patentable if they do
not transform physical subject matter into a different state or thing. Id. at 1430.
218. Id. at 1388-89 (Smith, J., dissenting). Administrative Patent Judge Jerry Smith
argued,
My view of this mandate is that an invention must in some manner be tied to a
recognized science or technology in order to promote the progress of the useful
arts. Although a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter will rarely fail to
meet the constitutional mandate, processes represent an especially troublesome
type of invention. This is because almost anything can be claimed as a series of
steps that technically can be considered a process, but the term process is so broad
that it can be used to claim inventions that cover nothing more than human conduct
or thought processes that are totally unrelated to any science or technology.
Id. at 1388.
219. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
220. In Ex parte Serkin, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences remanded the
application to the examiner for consideration under § 101, pointing out particular claims that
"recite only a mental process of matching without integrating a machine, or constituting a
process of manufacture, or the altering [of] a composition of matter." Appeal 2006-3104,
2007 WL 3325012, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 8. 2007).
Similarly, in Ex parte Brown, the board issued a new § 101 rejection finding that the
claimed invention "merely claims the mental process of controlling access to content by the
decision of a human," without "necessarily requir[ing] a machine, [or] describ[ing] a process
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As this section suggests, there currently are many tensions and
ambiguities in the case law regarding the scope of patentable processes,
especially with regard to processes that are not machine implemented and
processes that do not transform matter. Recognizing this uncertainty, the
Federal Circuit recently granted, sua sponte, an en banc hearing in In re
Bilski.221  Because the claims at issue in Bilski neither produce a
transformation nor involve a machine but ostensibly produce a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result," the case potentially is an excellent vehicle for
resolving some of these tensions in the previous case law. 222 Of particular
relevance, the Federal Circuit seeks to address the following questions: (1)
What standard should govern whether a process is § 101 patentable subject
matter? (2) When is subject matter patent ineligible because it constitutes
an abstract idea or mental process? (3) When are claims containing both
mental and physical steps eligible subject matter? (4) Must a statutory
process produce a physical transformation or be tied to a machine? (5)
Should State Street and AT&T be reconsidered and overruled in any
respect?223
C. Concerns About the Role of Statutory Subject Matter
As noted above with respect to process patents and patentable subject
matter in general, the patent system's regulatory reach has dramatically
expanded in recent years. This expansion has raised concerns about the
proper normative scope of the system.224 As Professor John R. Thomas has
suggested, "[d]etermining the appropriate subject matter for patenting is
important because a paucity of constraining doctrines allay the proprietary
of manufacture or a process for the alteration of a composition of matter." Appeal 2007-
0575, 2007 WL 3325013, at *13 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 8. 2007).
In Ex parte Kinzhalin, the board held that a method for testing software modules, which
recited steps such as "determining" and "marking" "can be considered merely a series of
mental processes" because the claim "does not recite any steps that necessarily involve
machine implementation." Appeal 2007-1416, 2007 WL 3114968, at *6 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 24,
2007). In Kinzhalin, the board focused its attention on whether the recitation of "automated"
in the preamble of the claim ties the mental steps to a particular machine. See id. at *7.
221. No. 2007-1130, 2008 WL 417680, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008). Oral argument
will be held on May 8, 2008.
222. See generally In re Bilski, Appeal 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006).
223. See Bilski, 2008 WL 417680, at *1.
224. John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 569, 572
(2002). The patent system is increasingly issuing patents that may conflict with important
competing interests such as free speech and privacy. For example, Professor Thomas argues
that issued patents appropriating abortion techniques, methods of complying with the tax
laws, and consumer surveying techniques are among those that "hold[] the potential to
impinge upon individual liberties in ways not previously considered possible." Id. at 570.
Professor Dan Burk has noted that "[t]he introduction of expressive subject matter [such as
computer software] into patent law" may raise First Amendment concerns. See Burk, supra
note 189, at 160-61. Professor Kevin Collins suggests that allowing patents with method
claims that recite steps such as "knowing" and "reasoning" may have the dangerous outcome
of propertizing thought. See generally Collins, supra note 60.
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rights associated with granted patents." 225  The broad current scope of
patentable subject matter has led some commentators to note that "the issue
of patentable subject matter may now be the least vital doctrine in the set of
statutory requirements for patentability. '226
While statutory subject matter is merely one of several requirements of
patentability, "there is sometimes a tendency to conflate consideration of
the appropriate scope of patentable subject matter with other requirements
of patentability, without considering whether each requirement should be
serving independent purposes." 227 While novelty and nonobviousness play
a key role in identifying patentable inventions, critics can point to patents
like the "Method of Exercising a Cat" to support the view that the bar for
both novelty and nonobviousness is too low or too difficult to apply
rigorously. 228 One solution is to use § 101 to police the proper scope of
patents. Some commentators, like Professor Eileen Kane, propose that
patentable subject matter should play a more active "gate-keeping" role,
especially in certain, highly technical fields such as biotechnology and
computer-related inventions.229  Alternatively, properly applying the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements rather than resorting to using §
101 as a blunt tool also addresses the allowance of questionable patents.
Indeed, commentators including Professor Michael Risch, argue that § 101
should be a low bar for patentability. Risch suggests that the other statutory
requirements should weed out improper inventions, and he therefore
advocates that the subject matter inquiry be strictly limited to determining
whether an invention falls within one of the four statutory categories. 230
Recent comments from Supreme Court justices suggest a willingness to
225. Thomas, supra note 97, at 1141. While limiting the scope of patentable subject
matter is certainly one way of reigning in the patent system, this is not the only approach.
See Drennan, supra note 188, at 252-53 ("As a practical matter, in most cases, the Federal
Circuit has eliminated both the statutory subject matter test and the utility test as restrictions
on the patentability of business methods. As leading commentators note, since neither test is
a 'gatekeeper,' that leaves... [']novelty and non-obviousness['] .... ).
226. Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 St.
John's L. Rev. 519, 523-25 (2006) (criticizing this view and urging that patentable subject
matter should play an active role).
227. Cynthia M. Ho, Lessons from Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc., 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 463, 479 (2007).
228. See id. (suggesting that §§ 102 and 103 establish too low of a threshold).
229. See Kane, supra note 226, at 519, 523.
230. Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, Intellectual Property Scholars Conference,
Aug. 9-10, 2007, available at
www.law.depaul.edu/centersinstitutes/ciplit/ipsc/pdf/MichaelRisch.pdf (abstract of speech
delivered at Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, Chicago Illinois) ("The currently
confused and inconsistent jurisprudence of patentable subject matter can be clarified by
implementing a single rule-that which is otherwise patentable under the Patent Act is
patentable subject matter. In other words, if a discovery otherwise meets the requirements of
patentability-namely category, utility, novelty, unobviousness, and specification-then the
discovery will be properly patentable .... [S]trict application of my proposed rule will in
fact reduce the number of discoveries that might otherwise be patentable.").
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visit the role of § 101,231 and, as noted above, an en banc Federal Circuit
will confront the scope of § 101 head-on when it rehears Bilski this year.232
D. Andrew Knight's Proposal to Patent Storylines
On November 3, 2005, the USPTO published the first of a series of
applications for storyline patents submitted by patent attorney Andrew
Knight.233 While the business and legal communities were intrigued by this
potentially new area of intellectual property,234 the patentability of Knight's
claims is controversial and unclear. 235  At the time Knight filed his
applications, the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street was the relevant
precedent for defining the scope of patentable processes, and shortly
thereafter, the Lundgren court broadened the scope of patentable processes
by denouncing the technological arts requirement. Since that time,
however, the opinions in LabCorp, Comiskey, and Nuijten have created
doubt about the scope of patentable processes. As the USPTO has just
begun examination of Knight's patent applications,236 an analysis of the
patentability of storyline process claims is timely.
1. Storyline Patent Applications
Knight proposes that a unique storyline qualifies as patentable subject
matter when claimed as a process 237 that can be performed by any potential
infringer, such as a screenwriter, director, actor, movie theater owner,
publisher, or even a consumer watching a movie at home.238 He suggests
that given a novel storyline, a process claim can be prepared that satisfies
the other statutory requirements for patentability, including novelty,
nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure.239
231. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
233. See supra note 26 (listing Knight's patent applications).
234. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 24.
235. See generally Ben Manevitz, What's the Story with Storyline Patents-an Argument
Against the Allowance of Proposed Storyline Patents and for the Rejection of Currently
Pending Storyline Patent Applications, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 717 (2006) (asserting
that storyline patent applications will likely fail under the subject matter, novelty and
nonobviousness requirements, and under public policy); Note, Pure Fiction: The Attempt to
Patent Plot, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 231 (2005) [hereinafter Harvard Note] (asserting that
storyline patent applications will likely fail under the subject matter requirement,
enablement, the First Amendment, and public policy); Lewis R. Clayton, 'Lundgren' and
Limits, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 2005, at 2 (asserting that storyline patent applications will likely
fail under the subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, indefiniteness, and enablement
requirements).
236. See Request for Information Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 from Corbett B. Cobum,
Primary Exam'r, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Andrew F. Knight (June 7, 2007) (on
file with author).
237. Knight frames his claims as "processes" because, presumably, storyline claims do
not fit within the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter categories.
238. See Knight, supra note 20, at 867.
239. See id. at 868.
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For example, under Knight's approach, process claims directed to the
storyline of Romeo and Juliet could be drafted as follows:
A process of relaying a story having a unique plot, the story
involving characters and having a timeline, comprising:
(a) indicating that a first character sees a second character and
desires said second character;
(b) indicating that said first character falls in love with said
second character;
(c) indicating that said second character also falls in love with
said first character;
(d) indicating that the families of said first character and said
second character are enemies;
(e) indicating that said first character kills a relative of said
second character; and
(f) indicating that said first character mistakenly believes that
said second character is dead and therefore wants to die. 240
Knight believes that this type of process claim "catch[es] the essence of
the [work's] underlying storyline," while "look[ing] and feel[ing] like a
method-an ordinary, functional, useful method."'241  A director would
infringe this process claim by making or showing a movie with these
elements, and a consumer would infringe by playing a DVD containing the
movie. 242 The claim also is broad enough to encompass other embodiments
of the storyline besides Romeo and Juliet. For example, a consumer
playing a DVD of West Side Story243 would infringe the claim because she
still would perform all of its steps.
Knight's first storyline patent application describes a storyline wherein
the protagonist's consciousness becomes "switched off' for a period of time
while he continued to live his life. 244 The protagonist subsequently "wakes
240. The language of this example claim tracks the language of the claimed storyline in
Knight's 10/722,473 patent application. See infra note 244 for the text of claim 1 from
Knight's 10/722,473 application. Of course, this example claim is -anticipated and not
patentable.
241. Knight, supra note 20, at 868.
242. See id.
243. West Side Story (United Artists 1961).
244. See generally U.S. Patent Application No. 10/722,473 (filed Nov. 28, 2008). The
first claim recites,
A process of relaying a story having a timeline and a unique plot involving
characters, comprising:
indicating a character's desire at a first time in said timeline for at least one of
the following:
a) to remain asleep or unconscious until a particular event occurs; and
b) to forget or be substantially unable to recall substantially all events
during the time period from said first time until a particular event occurs;
indicating said character's substantial inability at a time after said
occurrence of said particular event to recall substantially all events
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up" and realizes that many years have passed, but he has no memory of
them.245 The specification describes various embodiments of this plot.2 46
The specification also provides a written description of a "point of view,
characterization, setting, theme, and dialogue" and contains a full example
story. 247
2. Legal Basis for Granting Patent Protection
Knight suggests that the amnesia-story application discussed above
satisfies the statutory disclosure requirements, including enablement 248 and
definiteness. 249  He also believes that his application satisfies the
requirements of §§ 101, 102 and 103.250 Noting that § 101 has the lowest
during the time period from said first time to said occurrence of said
particular event; and
indicating that during said time period said character was an active
participant in a plurality of events.
Id. at6.
245. See id. at 4.
246. For example, the specification states, "the protagonist may be completely incapable
of recalling any event during his period of unconsciousness. Alternatively, he may be able
to remember a few events (representing a small fraction of the total), or he may have very
fuzzy, vague, or dream-like memories of a few or most events." Id. at 6. Thus, some
embodiments of the process may involve indicating that the protagonist cannot remember
anything from his period of unconsciousness while others may involve indicating that the
protagonist has some memories.
247. See Andrew F. Knight, A Patently Novel Plot: Fiction, Information, and Patents in
the 21st Century, 47 IDEA 203, 214 (2006).
248. Knight argues that the claimed invention is fully enabled because one of skill in the
art of storytelling can perform the claimed method as described in the specification to
produce the story. See id. at 214-15 (arguing that, just as a trained chef can produce a
hamburger from ground meat and a roll, one of ordinary skill in the art of storytelling can
produce a developed story from a detailed plot description). Furthermore, because the
specification contains a complete story, he notes that "any literate person can practice the
claimed invention simply by copying or relaying the story-containing disclosure." Id. at 218.
While particular embodiments may be enabled by the described storyline, the enablement
must be commensurate with the scope of the claims. Claim 1 as filed is quite broad and
likely not enabled by the disclosed story alone. See supra note 244.
249. Some method steps are intuitively definite-for example, "indicating that a first
character sees a second character" may be accomplished in recognizable ways without
specific direction in the specification on how to perform this step. See supra text
accompanying note 240. Other steps, like indicating that the first character "desires said
second character," may initially seem problematic. See id. Knight argues that subjective
words such as "desires" and "believes" should not raise problems of indefiniteness because
the steps actually being performed are "indicating." See Knight, supra note 20, at 868. ("In
other words, a step of 'desiring' might be problematic because desiring is an introspective,
subjective mental process that can doubtfully be measured .... However, 'indicating a
desire' is clear-a jury knows what that looks like, particularly if the specification gives
concrete examples of how one might indicate a desire .. "); see also Knight, supra note
247, at 219-21 (discussing why "[ojne of [o]rdinary [s]kill in the [a]rt of [s]torytelling
[w]ould [u]nderstand the [s]cope of the [c]laims [w]hen [r]ead in [c]onjunction with the
[s]pecification").
250. The most difficult statutory demands for storyline patents may be novelty and
nonobviousness requirements. Indeed, Knight "expect[s] novelty and non-obviousness
hurdles to be high to any would-be plot inventor" but suggests that these requirements are
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threshold of the statutory requirements, Knight invokes the broad reading of
§ 101 used by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.25 1 He
argues that statutory subject matter includes "'anything under the sun that is
made by man,"' except "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas." 252 Knight proposes that his storyline method claims are statutory
subject matter because they recite a process and do not fall within any of the
judicial exceptions. 253 He admits that "a story in the abstract is just that: an
unpatentable abstract idea," but distinguishes his invention as a "functional
method of implementing [a] plot" to produce the "'useful, concrete, tangible
result' of ... valuable entertainment. '254
3. Policy Rationales for Granting Patent Protection
a. Invention
Knight states, "There is something fundamentally inventive-in the same
way that conceiving of a new rocket engine design is inventive-about
creating a new storyline. The flash of inspiration is the same." 255 One need
not actually build a rocket to conceive a new rocket engine design, but
constructing a rocket containing the new engine design is certainly one way
to express that design. By analogy, Knight suggests one need not express-
i.e., write-an actual screenplay or novel to conceive an inventive storyline,
although one can certainly express an embodiment of the storyline by
writing the novel. 256 He argues that "[t]he spark of ingenuity is what gives
rise to the infinitely many ways of expressing an invention-whether in the
form of a tangible rocket engine or a novel-but without the invention there
is nothing to express," and suggests that both the rocket engine design and
the new storyline are "both inventions in a very real sense, distinct from
their possible expressions." 257
not insurmountable if the plot is indeed new. See Knight, supra note 247, at 213. This high
bar is necessary to ensure that patents are not granted that strip property from the public,
however, the examination process also should address this concern. See Knight, supra note
20, at 870. For example, Knight has already directed the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) to the film Total Recall, which may be relevant prior art. Information Disclosure
Statement by Applicant from Andrew F. Knight, First Named Inventor, to Corbett B.
Coburn, Exam'r, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Sept. 24, 2007). If this film or any other
art is cited against the 10/722,473 application as § 102 or 103 art, Knight will have the
opportunity to distinguish his invention by argument or by amending the claims.
251. See Knight, supra note 20, at 861.
252. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
253. See id. at 868-69.
254. Id. at 867.
255. Id. at 871.
256. See id. at 871-72.
257 Id at 872.
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b. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Knight suggests that the current intellectual property regime already
recognizes this dichotomy in the context of software.258 He points out that
poorly written software that implements a new and useful method may be
protected as a method patent, while a unique expression of software, even if
it encodes an archaic method, may be protected via copyright. 259 This dual
protection scheme recognizes that the method the software relays is not
only distinct from any particular expression of the method but is valuable in
its own right.260
Knight argues that a story may also comprise two such features: (1) a
specific expression of the storyline and (2) the underlying story itself.261
Either or both of these features may be valuable (and should be
protectable). For example, while the underlying storyline of Romeo and
Juliet likely was not novel when William Shakespeare wrote it,
Shakespeare's "particular expression of that underlying storyline is today as
brilliant and beautiful as the day it was written." 262  Conversely, the
underlying storyline may be valuable even if the particular expression of the
storyline is not. This may have been the case with Leon Arden's novel One
Fine Day,263 which arguably had less commercial value than its underlying
idea.
Knight suggests that there are storylines that are "so inventive, so
surprising, and so profound that any expression of [them] is valuable." 264
These "refreshingly original" storylines have value beyond the value of the
particular expression of the storyline, such that "public policy dictates a
need for legal protection, in the form of intellectual property rights, for the
entire work-expression and storyline. '265  Knight proposes that these
storylines should be protected by patents. 266
c. Public Interest
Knight believes that copyright law does not provide adequate incentives
for creating novel stories for movies and books because only the expression
of the story is protected and not the underlying idea of the storyline. 267 He
argues that the value of a copyright depends on an artist's ability as a
performer and not as an inventor.268 For example, an artistic inventor may
create an interesting and unique storyline but be such a poor writer that his
258. See id. at 860.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 871.
263. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
264. Knight, supra note 20, at 871 (emphasis omitted).
265. Id. at 860-61.
266. See id. at 877.
267. See id. at 874-76.
268. See id. at 876-77.
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expression of the storyline results in a copyrighted work with little value. 269
Knight argues that a Hollywood producer may recognize the creative value
of the underlying storyline and effectively steal it to make a blockbuster
movie, thus obtaining unearned financial benefit from the inventor's
unrewarded innovation. 270
Without patent protection, Knight argues, "the great artistic minds of the
day will be compelled to continue composing ... slightly altered dialogues
for carbon copied movie plots." 271 The ability to fully protect their artistic
inventions will motivate the creation of "never-seen-before, never-
experienced-before, intellectually inspiring forms of entertainment. '272
Knight's proposal has many critics, as discussed below in Part II, many
of whom suggest that patent protection will actually suppress artistic
creation and remove works from the public domain. Yet Knight points out
that a storyline application must meet stringent tests of patentability before
a patent is granted.273 Thus, an artist who composes a tale about star-
crossed lovers will not be able to patent her storyline, as it likely is not
novel or nonobvious. Such a storyline already is part of the public domain
and remains free for anyone to use.
As discussed above, the scope of patentable processes seemingly has
been expanding over the past several decades. Part II suggests that the
current scope of patentable subject matter might be broad enough to cover
Knight's storyline patents. Yet even now, the standard under which
Knight's applications will be examined is in flux. Determining whether
Knight's storyline process applications are patentable requires resolving
tensions and ambiguities in the case law regarding patentable processes and
other doctrines that limit the scope of patentable subject matter. The newest
case law may portend a coming constriction of the scope of patentable
subject matter that could well render Knight's claims unpatentable. As Ben
Klemens notes, given the current state of the law, "it is difficult to
determine whether storyline and legal method patents are just amusing
novelties, a brewing storm, or the dawn of a new age in tax loophole
innovation." 274 Part II addresses that question.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 876.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 877.
273. See id. at 870 ("An old storyline can never be patentable (Section 102). A storyline
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art can never be patentable (Section 103). An
indefinite storyline can never be patentable (Section 112)."); see also id. at 876 ("There is
little fear that artistic creation will be halted due to the enforcement of patent protection
newly applied to artistic inventions. A love song composer may indefinitely continue
writing love songs without worry of infringing any patent .... [E]ven if the broad concept
or invention of singing about love were statutory subject matter under § 101, it is as old as
civilization, and would not survive an attack under §§ 102-103.").
274. Klemens, supra note 32, at 20. See supra note 188 for a discussion of tax method
patents.
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II. AMBIGUITIES IN THE SCOPE OF PATENTABLE PROCESSES
Part II of this Note explores in greater detail the tensions and ambiguities
that emerge from the current case law regarding the scope of patentable
processes. In particular, this part focuses on how the patentability of
storyline processes depends on the courts' developing approach to applying
the doctrines of patentable processes, judicial exclusions to patentable
subject matter, mental steps, and the technological arts requirement. Part
II.A presents a broad reading of the case law in each of these four areas that
would support Knight's position that storyline processes are patentable.
Part II.B then articulates a narrow reading, in which these doctrines would
limit the scope of patentable subject matter and exclude storyline patents.
A. Interpretations of the Case Law That Allow Storyline Applications
Under current case law, which represents the result of a decades-long
expansion of statutory subject matter, Knight's storyline claims arguably
are patentable. State Street and its permissive progeny set the standard for
patentable processes at the time Knight filed his applications. 275
Judge Raymond C. Clevenger of the Federal Circuit noted after State
Street that "this court has recently held [that] virtually anything is
patentable." 276  Indeed, following the Federal Circuit's increasingly
permissive approach to statutory subject matter, the Patent Office has issued
method or process patents in a broad range of industries that previously
were strangers to patent protection, including tax methods, 277 artistic
methods, 278  entertainment methods, 279  architectural methods, 280
theology,281  athletic moves, 282  and non-computer-related business
methods.2 83 Such patents rely on a broad reading of the courts' approach to
275. See supra Part I.B.2.b (discussing State Street and AT&7).
276. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J.,
dissenting from the Order declining the suggestion for rehearing in banc).
277. See supra note 188 (discussing the tax method patent controversy).
278. See, e.g., Painting Kit and Related Method, U.S. Patent No. 6,022,219 (filed Dec. 18,
1998) (reciting a method of painting using a baby's butt).
279. See, e.g., Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17,
2000) (claiming a method of swinging that results in a "side-to-side swinging motion").
280. See, e.g., Method for Designing and Illustrating Architectural Enhancements to
Existing Buildings, U.S. Patent No. 5,668,736 (filed Jan. 25, 1995) (claiming a method that
presents designs to a client, allows the client to select a design idea, and prepares an image
of the remodeled building).
281. See, e.g., System for Allowing a Person to Experience Systems of Mythology, U.S.
Patent No. 5,734,795 (filed May 15, 1995) (claiming a virtual reality system for "personal
myth exploration," the uses of which include, inter alia, "spiritual quest, lifepath exploration
and shaping, [and] drug rehabilitation").
282. See, e.g., Method of Executing a Tennis Stroke, U.S. Patent No. 5,993,336 col.l 1.21
(filed Mar. 31, 1998) (claiming a method of "executing tennis strokes in difficult ball-return
situations" using a knee pad).
283. See, e.g., Systems and Methods for Making Jury Selection Determinations, U.S.
Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001) (claiming "[a] method of conducting a mock trial
exercise in a lawsuit pending before a court at law"); Building Block Training Systems and
Training Methods, U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (filed Apr. 23, 1997) (claiming a method for
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the patentable processes, judicial exclusions, mental steps, and
technological arts doctrines.
1. A Broad Interpretation of Statutory Processes
Citing State Street, Knight argues that "[a] method is a method and
should be examined as such. ' 284 Invoking the Supreme Court's declaration
in Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter includes "anything under the
sun that is made by man," he concludes that "[t]here is simply no statutory
or common law exempting from patentability a useful method for
producing entertainment. '285
Professor Richard Gruner suggests that "[m]uch of the current
uncertainty in the law of patentable subject matter stems from the failure of
the Supreme Court to articulate clear principles for separating patentable
applications from unpatentable abstract ideas." 286 He argues that the Court
basically has only addressed certain easy cases that involve an act or a
series of acts that perform some physical transformation. 287 For example,
while the Diehr court ultimately held that a process applying an abstract
idea or algorithm is patentable subject matter, the Court explicitly noted
that the claimed process performed a physical transformation. 288 Gruner
thus criticizes the Diehr Court for failing to clarify what "minimum
physical features or relationships to physical surrounds... are necessary to
place an advance within the range of patentable subject' matter."289 The
Court also failed to address "whether a statutory process must effect a
physical transformation-and if so, exactly what this means-or whether
[transforming an article to a different state or thing] is merely illustrative of
one type of statutory process." 290
As discussed in Part I.B above, the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance in the area of processes that do not involve physical manipulations
training a janitor); Shaving Method, U.S. Patent No. 6,014,975 (filed June 6, 1995) (claiming
a shaving method including the steps of soaking a razor in an astringent bath after each shave
and shaving with the razor while the razor is still wet with the astringent liquid from the
bath).
284. Knight, supra note 20, at 868. However, in Flook, the applicant argued that any
process that implements a principle in a specific fashion falls within § 101. 437 U.S. 584,
593 (1978). The Court stated that this assumption is "untenable" because "it would make the
determination of patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman's art and would
ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 'ideas' or phenomena of
nature." Id.
285. See Knight, supra note 20, at 868-69.
286. Gruner, supra note 102, at 400.
287. See id.
288. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing Diehr).
289. Gruner, supra note 102, at 408.
290. Cotter, supra, note 128, at 864-65. In fact, the Court has said that there are certain
processes that "the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an
article to a different state or thing)" but the laws do not specifically limit patentable
processes to only those that transform or reduce an article to a different state or thing. See,
e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981).
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of physical items. 291 Regardless, the Federal Circuit has defined certain
minimum features necessary for a process to be patentable, ruling that a
statutory process does not require a physical manipulation, as long as it
produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result. 292 Knight argues that his
storyline processes satisfy these requirements because they produce the
"'useful, concrete, tangible result' of . . . valuable entertainment. ' '293
Therefore, given the lack of clear Supreme Court guidance, Knight's claims
arguably are patentable under the current Federal Circuit standard for
processes. Indeed, Gruner argues that the Federal Circuit's State Street test
has normative merit.294
Although recent decisions by the Federal Circuit question the relevance
of State Street's "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test, Gruner asserts
that this test "seems well grounded and a useful means to carry the patent
system forward to socially desirable impacts regarding new
technologies." 295 He argues that the "useful, concrete, and tangible result"
test "should be upheld in the face of doubts about that standard recently
expressed by Justice Breyer."296
Justice Breyer's comments have precipitated a significant debate within
the Federal Circuit over the scope of patentable subject matter, resulting in
Judge Linn's dissent in Nuitjen, described above. 297 Even if Judge Linn's
position eventually were to become law, however, Knight's storyline
processes still may be patentable.
Unlike the Comiskey court, Judge Linn apparently would not use § 101 to
limit the scope of patent protection, at least not without further guidance
from Congress. 298 Although his opinion acknowledges the pressure to start
291. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
292. See supra Part I.B.2.b (discussing State Street and AT&T).
293. See Knight, supra note 20, at 867.
294. See Gruner, supra note 102, at 401.
295. Id. at 402.
296. Id. at 401-02. Specifically, Justice Breyer notes that the Federal Circuit test is
inconsistent with O'Reilly, Flook, and Gottschalk. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2928 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the
invalidated claim in Morse was improperly broad and attempted to patent electromagnetism.
See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing Morse). The Court's decision in
Diehr "appears to have taken a broader view of patentable subject matter... [and] has been
viewed as being in tension with Flook." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607).
297. In re Comiskey may be the Federal Circuit's attempt to narrow the scope of
patentable subject matter in response to Justice Breyer's comments in LabCorp. The
Comiskey court did not try to reconcile its newly restrictive test with its own precedent. The
court neither applied nor rejected its long-used "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test.
The court also did not address its own holding in AT&T determining that a "physical
transformation" is not "an invariable requirement" of a process. Rather, the court simply
pointed out that the claimed inventions in Alappat, State Street, and AT&T were tied to
machines, making them statutory subject matter. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379-80
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
298. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Congress's willingness to legislatively restrict patentable subject
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drawing clearer exclusionary lines that accord with "'common sense and the
public weal,"' he argues that the court should not preempt congressional
action with judicial activism.299 Under his analysis, subject matter satisfies
§ 101 if it falls within one of the four statutory categories that essentially
encompass "anything under the sun that is made by man," and is "new" and
"useful. '300  Claims that improperly recite laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas will not pass the "new" and "useful" tests.301
Even if State Street's "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test is
rejected in favor of some new standard resembling Judge Linn's analysis,
Knight's storyline claims may satisfy these requirements. A storyline is
made by man and is the product of the storyteller. Unlike natural
phenomena, laws of nature, mathematical algorithms, and scientific
principles, it does not preexist in nature and is a new creation.30 2 Therefore,
it arguably passes the newness requirement. 30 3 Knight's storyline claims
also ostensibly satisfy Judge Linn's "usefulness" test.30 4 Knight's storyline
claim confers a specific benefit-namely, the generation of a story
comprising specific elements for the purpose of entertainment. 30 5 Just as
Nuijten's electronic signal is useful in a direct and specific way, because it
performs its articulated function as specified, Knight's claims do exactly
what they claim to do-namely, they relay a story having a timeline and a
unique plot involving characters. 30 6
Thus, whether the relevant test for identifying a statutory process is the
State Street test or Judge Linn's analytical framework, storyline processes
may survive a statutory process analysis.
2. A Narrow Interpretation of Abstract Ideas
Although the Supreme Court has not clearly defined what specific ideas
are abstract enough to fall under this judicial exception to the scope of
patentable subject matter, the Court has stated that "[a]n idea of itself is not
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful
is." 307 While the Court has consistently held that a mathematical algorithm,
separate from its practical application, falls within the judicial exception
matter, as demonstrated by the proposed per se exclusion on tax planning method patents,
bolsters Judge Linn's approach.
299. Id. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
300. Id. at 1363.
301. See id. at 1364.
302. The § 102 novelty requirement will exclude any storyline claim that has already
been performed and is part of the prior art.
303. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1363-64 (interpreting the "new" requirement). For further
discussion of Judge Linn's analysis of the "new" requirement, see the text accompanying
notes 77-80.
304. See id. at 1365-67 (interpreting the "useful" requirement). For further discussion of
Judge Linn's analysis of the "useful" requirement, see the text accompanying notes 81-84.
305. See Knight, supra note 20, at 867.
306. See Nu'ten, 500 F.3d at 1368 (discussing the usefulness of the claimed signal).
307. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
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and is not patentable, 30 8 Gruner notes that the Court's analyses generally
have lacked a clear discussion of the minimum features required for an
idea's implementation to be considered a practical application, rather than
just an unpatentable idea.309
The Comiskey court further confused the issue of what constitutes an
abstract idea. The Federal Circuit's discussion suggests that any process
that involves a mental step is an abstract idea. 310 As discussed below,
however, one can envision inventions that require a so-called "mental step"
that are not merely abstract ideas, because the patent application can
provide detailed instructions for performing the step. 311 For instance, the
applicant in Bilski argues that methods are not mere abstract ideas when
they set forth a series of specific, real-world, physical acts for achieving a
useful objective. 312 The applicant suggests that examples of abstract ideas
would be process claims that recite "somehow transmitting information
with electromagnetism" or "somehow supplying a commodity at a fixed
price. '313 Similarly, Knight admits that "a story in the abstract is just that:
an unpatentable abstract idea," but he attempts to distinguish his invention
as a "functional method of implementing [a] plot" to produce the useful,
concrete, and tangible result of valuable entertainment.
314
Even if a storyline is considered to be an unpatentable abstract idea,
Knight argues that a well-articulated process for communicating the
storyline is not an abstract idea and should not be patentable. Given the
lack of a clear judicial standard for what constitutes an abstract idea,
Knight's proposal is at least plausible on its face.
3. A Narrow Interpretation of the Mental Steps Doctrine
The courts have applied mental steps exclusions under a variety of
circumstances, and storyline method claims may be allowable under some
of these standards. For example, courts have invoked the mental steps
doctrine to exclude patent claims that cover activities that take place solely
inside the human mind, such as aesthetic judgments.315 Some courts have
invoked this doctrine where the results produced by the claimed method are
not predictable due to the potential vagaries of the mental steps involved.
3 16
308. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981) ("[A] mathematical formula,
like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent ... .
309. Gruner, supra note 102, at 400.
310. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(implying that mental processes are an example of an abstract concept or algorithm).
311. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing claims that satisfy the disclosure requirement
despite containing mental steps).
312. See Brief of Appellants at 9, In re Bilski, 2007 WL 851293 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2007)
(No. 2007-1130).
313. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. See Knight, supra note 20, at 867.
315. Cotter, supra note 128, at 860-61 & n.16.
316. McClaskey, supra note 104, at 1166-69 (discussing Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of
Am., 54 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1931); Johnson v. Duquesne Light Co., 29 F.2d 784 (W.D. Pa.
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This doctrine also may be viewed as an effort to prevent patents on thought
processes in general, with a potential normative basis as a means of
protecting the public's First Amendment rights.317
Because the courts' basis for applying the mental steps doctrine "has
been somewhat ambiguous," Cotter proposes four possible approaches to
applying the doctrine. 318 First, while noting that courts have not adopted-
and commentators have not advocated-such a broad approach, Cotter
suggests that the most expansive possible interpretation of the mental steps
doctrine "would render unpatentable a process that contains any steps that
can be performed mentally, regardless of whether (1) the process also
contains steps that are incapable of being performed mentally, or (2) the
steps that can be performed mentally also can be performed non-
mentally." 319  Conversely, the narrowest and least limiting application
would limit the doctrine's scope of exclusion only to processes that must be
performed in a human mind and that cannot be performed by a machine or
apparatus. 320 A third, intermediate view is that "a process that can be
performed entirely by mental steps is unpatentable, even if the process also
can be performed by means of a machine or apparatus." 321  A fourth
interpretation is that a process is unpatentable if the invention's novel
aspect depends on a mental step or steps. 322
In narrowing the scope of the mental steps doctrine, the Musgrave court
suggested that the mental steps inquiry should be part of the examiner's
analysis under § 112, rather than § 101.323 Processes whose performance
requires a certain level of human thought will produce results that vary
depending on the identity of the performer. For example, the results of the
method of associating light and music for aesthetic expression at issue in
1928); Exparte Mayne, 59 U.S.P.Q. 342 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942)). McClaskey argues that
Johnson, Greenewalt, and Mayne suggest that "methods relying on interpretive human
judgments or emotions are too indefinite to constitute statutory subject matter. The
performance of such methods does not produce predictable results, and, therefore, the
methods cannot be disclosed in such a way that an individual can perform them to achieve a
particular result." Id. at 1169. For example, in Greenewalt, the court held that a method of
"combining sound and light for aesthetic expression" was not patentable subject matter
where "[w]hat is done in carrying the method into effect [is] determined by the aesthetic and
emotional reaction of the individual [performing the method], and such reactions may differ
with different individuals." 54 F.2d at 196. Accordingly, Katherine Ambrose argues that
"[t]he mental steps doctrine should play no role in determining statutory subject matter,"
although "processes involving subjective human mental activity will properly fail under
section 112 for inexactness." See Ambrose, supra note 48, at 917.
317. See Cathy E. Cretsinger, AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 15 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 165, 178 n.120 (2000) ("The prohibition on patenting thought could also be
justified on First Amendment grounds.").
318. Cotter, supra note 128, at 860-61.
319. Id. at 861.
320. Id. (emphasis omitted).
321. Id.
322. Id. This test is often called the "point of novelty test." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
323. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also supra note 316.
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Greenewalt will vary depending on a person's aesthetic judgment.324
Accordingly, these claims would fail § 112's requirements and would not
be patentable. 325 Katherine Ambrose has described the relevant inquiry:
Is the process disclosed so exactly that one skilled in the art could follow
the process and produce the same result? If the process involves
something incapable of exact description, such as discretionary judgment,
belief, or feeling on the part of the human operator, or any mental step of
such sophistication that it could not be performed by a machine, then and
only then should the process fail to receive a patent on the strength of the
mental steps doctrine.326
Although the Comiskey court did not address its predecessor court's
decision in Musgrave suggesting that the mental steps inquiry is best
viewed as a § 112 investigation, Comiskey's outcome is consistent with
Ambrose's test. The court held that because the product of Comiskey's
claimed arbitration method depends on the discretionary judgment of the
arbitrator, the method is not drawn to patentable subject matter. 327
Applied to the issue at hand, one can envision inventions-including
storyline patents-that require a so-called "mental step" but still satisfy §
112 because their applications provide detailed instructions for performing
the required steps. For example, a step that requires "determining" simply
invokes human operation, rather than human creativity, if the application
provides a sufficiently detailed disclosure for how to make the
determination. It therefore would seem that a storyline process application
could be drafted to provide enough detailed disclosure to allow a user to
successfully perform all of the "indicating" steps and produce the story,
without requiring any discretionary judgment, belief, or feeling. Under the
Musgrave interpretation, the mental steps doctrine would not be a bar to
patenting such storyline processes.
4. Arguments Against a Technological Arts Requirement
As discussed above, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
eliminated the technological arts requirement in Lundgren, opening the
door for business method patents that do not require computer
implementation. 328 Critics of the technological arts requirement applauded
this decision, noting that neither the Patent Act nor previous case law
324. See Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of Am., 54 F.2d 195, 196 (3d Cir. 1931).
325. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of § 112).
326. Ambrose, supra note 48, at 917.
327. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Comiskey's
independent claims 1 and 32 claim the mental process of resolving a legal dispute between
two parties by the decision of a human arbitrator.").-
328. See generally Barry Schindler, Key Ruling for Business Methods: 'Lundgren'Holds
that a 'Technological Basis 'Isn't Necessar for a Patent, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 5, 2005, at 1-2.
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supported the requirement. 329 While the Federal Circuit has not opined on
the matter, the USPTO and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
presently do not require patentable subject matter to have a technological
basis. 330  Accordingly, under current administrative precedent, the
nontechnological nature of Knight's inventions should not prevent their
eligibility for patent protection.
B. Interpretations of the Case Law That Exclude Storyline Applications
While the scope of patentable subject matter apparently has been
expanding over the past several decades, some Supreme Court justices have
recently questioned the Federal Circuit's patentable subject matter
jurisprudence. 331  The lower courts' reactions to the Supreme Court's
opinion in LabCorp have created further uncertainty in this area, and may
indicate the beginning of a contraction in the scope of patentable subject
matter. This section resolves the tensions in the case law regarding
statutory processes, abstract ideas, mental steps, and the technological arts
requirement in a way that would limit the scope of patentable subject matter
and potentially exclude Knight's storyline claims.
1. A Narrow Interpretation of Statutory Processes
Since State Street and AT&T, many patent applicants have assumed that
the sole test for a patentable process is whether the invention produces a
useful, concrete, and tangible result. This view arguably overlooks the
constitutional requirement that protectable inventions must further the
"useful arts."332 This view also arguably overlooks the Supreme Court's
determination that the definition of statutory process is narrower than the
literal meaning of the word "process." 333 In Diehr, the Court noted that
Congress did not add the term "process" to the patent statute until 1952, and
when it did so, it adopted the definition that has evolved in the courts. 334
The USPTO argues that this judicial definition limits statutory processes to
329. See generally John A. Squires & Thomas S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a
Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean That the USPTO is Finally Getting the Statutory
Subject Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561 (2006).
330. See 1300 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 142, Annex III (Nov. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm (advising patent
examiners not to consider whether the claimed invention is within the technological arts).
331. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
332. Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office at 4, In re
Bilski, 2007 WL 851293 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2007) (No. 2007-1130).
333. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
334. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981) ("Although the term 'process' was
not added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952[,] a process has historically enjoyed patent
protection because it was considered a form of 'art' as that term was used in the 1793
Act.... Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a 'process' did not
change with the addition of that term to § 101.").
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processes that are "tied to a particular apparatus" or transform materials to a
"different state or thing." 335
Although the Supreme Court has declined to hold that statutory processes
must involve a "transformation," 336 it has yet to endorse any other test for
eligibility, nor has it held patentable any process that does not meet this
requirement. The USPTO suggests that "concerns for future, unforeseen
technologies that potentially would not fit within the existing
transformation rubric, yet nevertheless may be worthy of patent protection"
motivated the Supreme Court's position.337 New eligibility tests may be
required under such circumstances. 338 While expansion of the scope of
statutory processes may be needed to accommodate emerging
technologies, 339 one of Knight's critics argues that "[a] fictional storyline,
unlike software, is neither established technology nor emerging
technology," so "[t]he Federal Circuit's policy rationale in the decisions
cautiously upholding patents of traditionally nonpatentable subject matter
does not support extending patent protection to fictional plots."
340
As noted above, storyline processes might qualify as patentable subject
matter if the "useful, concrete, and tangible results" test is the single
governing standard. But while State Street and its progeny were the most
recent precedent at the time Knight filed his storyline applications, the
Federal Circuit's recent opinion in Comiskey may signal a turn away from
this rather permissive standard toward a focus on more bright-line rules.
The Comiskey test may prove to be a higher bar for Knight's storyline
method claims than the State Street test. The Comiskey court held that
methods that claim an abstract concept or algorithm, including a mental
process, either must be tied to a particular apparatus or must produce some
physical transformation. 341 The court further held that claims that recite
one of the three other types of statutory subject matter-machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter-in addition to the process
encompassing an abstract concept or algorithm are patentable subject
matter. 342 Knight's storyline process claims do not recite one of the three
other types of statutory subject matter, do not involve a physical
335. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 332, at 16 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
588 n.9 (1978)). The USPTO notes that Federal Circuit has extrapolated the Supreme
Court's transformation test to include computer-implemented processes that transform data.
See id. at 20 ("[Wlhile Diehr involved the transformation of a tangible object--curing
synthetic rubber-[the Federal Circuit] also regards the transformation of intangible subject
matter to similarly be eligible, so long as the data signals represent some real world activity.
The [USPTO] views this 'data transformation' test as an appropriate way to evaluate subject
matter eligibility.").
336. See supra notes 128, 137 and accompanying text.
337. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 332, at 17 (emphasis omitted).
338. See id. at 17-18.
339. See Harvard Note, supra note 235, at 237.
340. Id. at 238.
341. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1374-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
342. Id. at 1377.
30452008]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
transformation, and are not tied to any particular apparatus.343 Therefore,
Knight's claims do not satisfy Comiskey's test for statutory processes.
2. A Broad Interpretation of Abstract Ideas
From a public-interest standpoint, the judicially created exceptions to
patentable subject matter serve the important function of protecting public
access to certain basic subject matter and ideas that otherwise might be
patentable. 344  Applying these exceptions, however, can be difficult.
Gruner argues that the Flook opinion properly distinguishes judicially
excluded natural phenomena and abstract ideas from patentable applications
of these basic principles:
Advances restating a principle or phenomenon of nature are unpatentable,
not because they lack the physical features needed to make them
"processes" within the meaning of the Patent Act, but rather because the
naturally occurring features of these advances preexist the advances and,
hence, are not "discoveries" of the sorts needed to qualify for patent
protections.... By contrast, an idea is unpatentable because it is not
useful in the right way absent the addition of either a way to use the idea
to achieve a physical manipulation or a way to use the idea to interpret a
physical situation in a useful way.... Both an unpatentable abstract idea
and an unpatentable principle of nature can be used to construct a
patentable invention if something more-in the words of the Court in
[Flook] an additional "inventive concept"-is added that distinguishes the
idea or phenomenon from the invention sought to be patented. 345
Storyline processes would not be excluded under the first rationale
articulated in the Flook opinion, which excludes preexisting principles and
natural phenomena, 346 because storylines arguably are not preexisting in
nature and are the products of human creation. But the second rationale
does provide a plausible basis for excluding storylines by characterizing
them as abstract ideas. Gruner argues that according to Flook, an idea is
unpatentably abstract when it needs "something more" to be useful-i.e., to
produce a physical result or interpret a physical situation in a useful way. 347
Following this reasoning, a general idea for a storyline, even when
343. However, Comiskey implies that these § 101 hurdles can be overcome by coupling
Knight's process to a specific machine. See id. at 1376. For example, the claims could be
tied to a television or some other method of display. The court notes that doing so may raise
obviousness concerns even if the invention satisfies novelty and subject matter requirements.
See id. at 1380.
344. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing "the core of the judicial doctrine by which laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patentable subject matter").
345. Gruner, supra note 102, at 407.
346. See id.
347. See id.
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expressed in the language of a process, is likely a "disembodied
concept[] ."348
Indeed, one critic specifically argues that Knight's storyline patent
applications do not encompass patentable subject matter because they seek
to protect abstract ideas. 349 Noting that the Supreme Court has long held
that ideas alone are not patentable, 350 this anonymous commentator asserts
that Knight's storyline patents simply "list[] ideas for plot points combined
to form ... a unique storyline," resulting in "a combination of abstract
ideas." 351 Because the Federal Circuit has held that simply "taking several
abstract ideas and manipulating them together" does not render
unpatentable ideas patentable, Knight's combinations of plot points should
not be patentable. 352 For these reasons, under Flook and previous Federal
Circuit case law, Knight's applications could be rejected as claiming ideas
that are unpatentably abstract.
3. A Broad Interpretation of the Mental Steps Doctrine
Parts I.B.4.a and II.A.3 discuss varying approaches to the mental steps
exclusion that the courts have used in the past and may potentially invoke in
the future. Under some of these approaches, storyline patent claims will be
excluded from patentable subject matter for containing impermissible
mental steps. The Federal Circuit's recent opinion in Comiskey may
portend a reinvigoration of such an application of this doctrine.
Although the Federal Circuit's recent opinion in Comiskey invoked the
mental steps doctrine, it did not provide much specific guidance regarding
the doctrine's proper application, perhaps because the arbitration method at
issue presented a relatively easy and compelling case for exclusion. 353 The
court limited its consideration of prior precedent to clarifying that "a
process of human thinking in and of itself' is not patentable. 354 It then held
that Comiskey's non-machine-implemented arbitration method claims were
not patentable because they "seek to patent the use of human intelligence in
348. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[A]bstract ideas
constitute disembodied concepts or truths which are not 'useful' from a practical standpoint
standing alone, i.e., they are not 'useful' until reduced to some practical application.").
349. Harvard Note, supra note 235, at 239-40 (suggesting further that "ideas within
fiction can never be protected, even by the less stringent copyright regime").
350. See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea
of itself is not patentable .. "); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981);
accord Buck v. Ooms, 63 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D.D.C. 1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.
1947) ("[Patents] can be awarded only in respect to a concrete embodiment of an idea,
whether the embodiment is a device, a product, or a process.").
351. Harvard Note, supra note 235, at 240.
352. Id. at 239-40.
353. This is unfortunate as a more difficult case may have better clarified what kinds of
claims warrant a mental steps inquiry.
354. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see id. at 1378 n.15 ("To the
extent that language in the [Musgrave] opinion might suggest that mental processes standing
alone are patentable, the broad language in the opinion was significantly cabined by
Benson.").
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and of itself."355 Applying Comiskey, the Board of Patent Appeals has
subsequently invoked the mental steps doctrine to reject claims that recite
"matching," "controlling access to content," "determining," and "marking,"
where the claims do not explicitly recite machine implementation.356
The language of the Comiskey opinion suggests that the Federal Circuit
was applying a broad interpretation of the mental steps inquiry, rather than
the limited § 112 inquiry proposed by Ambrose and the court in
Musgrave.357 Patent attorney Cathy Cretsinger argues that the mental steps
doctrine should be used to limit patents on thought processes. 358 She
argues that inventors must be free to think in order to invent.359 Used in
this way, a broad mental steps doctrine may serve as a proxy for First
Amendment considerations. 360
Assuming the Federal Circuit is using the mental steps doctrine to
balance First Amendment concerns against patent rights, storyline methods
arguably should meet the same fate as Comiskey's arbitration method. 361
Moreover, if the court is using the doctrine to reject claims that attempt to
patent human thought, storyline ideas also should fail. The Comiskey court
indicated that human thought processes can be part of a patentable claim if
the claim includes both a mental process and one of the other categories of
statutory subject matter.362 Since Knight's storyline process claims do not
include a machine, a manufacture, or a composition of matter, however,
they would be unpatentable under this interpretation of the doctrine.
4. Arguments for a Technological Arts Requirement
Many controversial patents, including the "Method for Exercising a
Cat,"' 363 the "Method for Swinging on a Swing, '364 and the "Method of
Executing a Tennis Stroke," 365 "bear little if any relationship to what most
people would think of as 'technology."' 366 While the Patent Clause, the
patent statutes, and Supreme Court jurisprudence do not explicitly require
patentable subject matter to be technological, 367 such a requirement indeed
has some basis. Despite the technology-neutral language of the patent
statue, an originalist interpretation of the language of the Constitution's
355. Id. at 1379.
356. See supra note 220 and the cases cited therein.
357. See supra notes 207, 323-26 and accompanying text.
358. See Cretsinger, supra note 317, at 178-79 (discussing the role of the mental steps
doctrine in limiting patents on thought processes).
359. See id.
360. See id. at 178 n.120.
361. See Harvard Note, supra note 235, at 244-49 (discussing the First Amendment
implications of storyline patents).
362. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
363. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 279.
365. See supra note 282.
366. Cotter, supra note 128, at 869.
367. See Squires & Biemer, supra note 329, at 568-79.
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Patent Clause justifies a technological arts requirement. Because the Patent
Clause recites that patents are intended to "promote the Progress of [the]
useful Arts," "commentators and courts over the years have suggested that
this language could be used to restrict patentable subject matter to the
useful or technological arts, as opposed to the cultural or liberal arts. '368
As Professor John Thomas argues, "it is unlikely the Framers saw every
created thing as encompassed within [the term useful Arts]. They
undoubtedly contemplated the industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the
late eighteenth century, in contrast to the seven 'liberal arts' and the four
'fine arts . . "'369
While critics of a technological arts requirement argue that it has no
statutory basis and otherwise is unworkable, 370 Cotter counters that such a
limitation is workable and needed to prevent the grant of patents-such as
the recent patents claiming "methods for terminating pregnancy, for
advising clients with respect to tax and regulatory compliance, and for
various methods of communication"-that intrude on important personal
liberties. 371 He suggests that critics overstate the difficulty of defining the
technological arts and of implementing the requirement.372  Indeed,
although Judge Barrett argued in his Lundgren concurrence that a
technological arts test is "unworkable," he himself proposed to limit the
patentability of non-machine-implemented processes to those that involve a
physical transformation, 373 essentially the same approach advanced by the
Comiskey court. 374
Because the Board of Patent Appeals's post-Comiskey opinions have
evinced a rather restrictive interpretation of § 101, some commentators
suggest that the board already is using a limited technological arts test. For
example, in Ex Parte Kinzhalin the board rejected a claim to an
"automated" method as implicating mental steps, declaring the use of the
term "automated" to be merely precatory. 375 In reviewing the board's
368. Collins, supra note 60, at 345-46.
369. Thomas, supra note 97, at 1164. "The seven historic 'liberal arts' were: grammar,
logic (dialectics), rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy[.] The four 'fine arts'
were: painting, drawing, architecture and sculpture; to which were often added: poetry,
music, dancing and drama." Id. at 1164 n. 189 (quoting Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the
Statutory UsefulArts, Part 11, 34 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 487, 494-96 (1952)).
370. See generally Squires & Biemer, supra note 329.
371. See Cotter, supra note 128, at 881-82.
372. See id. at 884-94 (proposing a technological arts requirement); see also Thomas,
supra note 97, at 1163-85 (proposing a normative role for a technological arts requirement).
373. Exparte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1430 (B.P.A.I. 2005).
374. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Comiskey court noted
that the "Supreme Court has recognized only two instances in which such a [process reciting
abstract concepts] may qualify as i section 101 process: when the process 'either [1] was
tied to a particular apparatus' or [2] operated to change materials to a 'different state or
thing."' Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978)).
375. Exparte Kinzhalin, Appeal 2007-1416, 2007 WL 3114968, at *7 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 24,
2007) ("' [Alutomated' is merely an expression of intended use that, at best, recites a desired
result of the claimed method.... Perhaps the intended use of the method will involve a
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recent decisions involving § 101, one commentator notes that "[t]o first
approximation, the Board's view is that a claim has to have the word
'computer' in it."'376 Professor Dennis Crouch takes this observation even
further, suggesting that the USPTO is resurrecting the technological arts
requirement rejected in Lundgren.377  Patent attorney Peter Zura
characterizes the recent § 101 rejections as ranging "from the laughable to
the outrageous," 378 arguing, "The biggest problem is that there is an
aggressive agenda to reign in 35 USC 101, but the [USPTO] has been
incapable of formulating a clear position on the limits of 101.,,379
The board's post-Comiskey activity suggests that, Lundgren
notwithstanding, Knight's storyline applications may not encompass
sufficiently technological processes for the USPTO to deem them
patentable without further clarification from the courts. The board's recent
decisions suggest that Knight's applications may fail a de facto
technological arts requirement, even if the USPTO is not explicitly using
that term. Further, though courts have until now ostensibly been expanding
the scope of patentable subject matter, this expansion may be "rooted in a
desire to protect emerging technologies," and storylines are not an emerging
technology. 380
The above discussion highlights some of the tensions and ambiguities in
the case law addressing the scope of patentable subject matter that must be
resolved in order to determine whether Knight's storyline processes are
patentable subject matter. As discussed in Part I, the Federal Circuit is
likely to opine on many of these issues in the upcoming en banc Bilski
case.381  The following part analyzes the patentability of Knight's
applications under the current case law and recommends that the Bilski
court limit the scope of patentable processes by clarifying some of these
ambiguities in the law as it stands today.
III. THE PATENTABILITY OF STORYLINE PROCESSES
Part II explored tensions in the case law regarding the scope of patentable
processes, abstract ideas, the mental steps doctrine, and the technological
arts requirement. These are all areas of potential expansion or contraction
machine, but we decline to infer such intentions suggested in the present specification into
the claims.").
376. Posting of Patent Hawk to The Patent Prospector: An Open Forum of Patent
Information & Opinion, http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/11/101_crumble-l.html
(Nov. 13, 2007, 10:51 PM).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.; see also Peter Zura's 271 Patent Blog,
http://271patent.blogspot.com/2007/11/chaos-patentable-subject-matter.html (Nov. 6, 2007,
7:44 AM) (discussing the PTO's "conflicting rationales over the patentability of specific
software and algorithmic processes").
380. Harvard Note, supra note 235, at 238.
381. See In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 WL 417680, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008)
(listing questions to be addressed in the en banc hearing); supra notes 221-23 and
accompanying text (discussing Bilski).
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in the scope of patentable subject matter. As discussed above, these
ambiguities can be resolved to either include or exclude storyline processes
from the realm of statutory subject matter. Ultimately, however, given the
current state of the Federal Circuit case law, including developments that
occurred after Knight first filed his storyline applications, are his proposed
storyline processes patentable? And will this still be the case after the
Federal Circuit rehears In re Bilski382 en banc? How should the en banc
Federal Circuit resolve the tensions identified in Part II when it confronts
them in Bilski? Part III addresses these questions.
A. The Subject Matter Eligibility of Storyline Processes
Under Current Federal Circuit Case Law
This section examines, under current case law, whether a court likely
would find Knight's storylines to be patentable subject matter. Comiskey is
the most recent controlling authority on this topic. For the following
reasons, Knight's applications do not satisfy the standards for patentable
subject matter set forth in Comiskey.383
Comiskey presents a significant hurdle to patenting storyline processes,
because it resuscitated and liberally applied limiting doctrines that the
courts had previously constricted or discarded. First, as discussed in Parts I
and II above, the court articulated a more restrictive standard than State
Street's "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test for identifying patentable
processes involving abstract ideas.384 The Comiskey court held that a
process claim that includes an abstract idea is statutory subject matter only
if the claim involves one of the other three classes of statutory subject
matter: machines, articles of manufactures, or compositions of matter. 385
The court also held that such processes qualify under § 101 if they are "tied
to a particular apparatus" or change materials to a "different state or
thing."386
Knight's storyline processes do not involve machines, articles of
manufactures, or compositions of matter.387  Moreover, his claimed
methods neither are tied to a particular apparatus nor produce a physical
transformation of materials. 388 Accordingly, Knight's storyline processes
likely do not qualify as statutory subject matter under this analysis.
The court further held that "mental processes-or processes of human
thinking-standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical
application," 389 explaining that "the patent statute does not allow patents on
382. SeeBilski, 2008 WL 417680, at *1.
383. See Part I.D.1 for a discussion of Knight's patent applications.
384. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text (discussing the test applied by the
Comiskey court)
385. See Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1376.
386. See id. (agreeing with the USPTO's argument).
387. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Knight's patent applications).
388. See supra Part I.D.1.
389. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1377.
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particular systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence
alone." 390 The court used this construction of the mental steps doctrine to
invalidate all of Comiskey's arbitration claims that did not require a
computer for implementation. 391 Like Comiskey's method claims, which
used mental processes to resolve a legal dispute, Knight's storyline claims
similarly attempt to patent human thinking alone. Knight's claims likely
are unpatentable for this reason as well.
Finally, the court explained that a mental process may constitute
patentable subject matter when combined with a machine or with one of the
other categories of statutory subject mater.392 In a sense, this provision
introduces a de facto technological arts requirement because, as illustrated
by the claims at issue in Comiskey, an otherwise unpatentable mental
process becomes eligible for protection when a step in the claimed
process-including trivial steps-is implemented by a computer.393
Knight's applications do not satisfy this requirement because the claims do
not involve machines or any other category of statutory subject matter,
although this is a strategy that storyline patent applicants may pursue in the
future if Comiskey remains the governing standard.394
Beyond the negative implications of Comiskey, Knight's applications
also implicate the prohibition on artful drafting. Many commentators have
suggested that nearly any possible endeavor can be claimed as a process
simply by stating the action as a series of steps. 395 Courts therefore should
view with skepticism any claims that have been artfully drafted in the form
of processes simply to invoke that category of statutory subject matter
where no other category may be appropriate. As discussed in Part 1.B, for
example, the applicant in Flook argued that any process that implements a
principle in a specific fashion falls within § 101.396 The Court stated that
this assumption is "untenable" because "[i]t would make the determination
of patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman's art," rather
than on the nature of the invention. 397 Knight's storyline processes likewise
are an example of artful drafting.398 He seeks to protect unpatentable ideas
by couching his claims as processes simply as a means of finding a
statutory hook under § 101.
Because Knight's applications do not satisfy the standards for patentable
subject matter set forth in Comiskey and also violate the Supreme Court's
390. Id. at 1378.
391. See id. at 1379.
392. See id. at 1377.
393. See id. at 1379-80.
394. For example, a storyline method could include an apparatus for viewing the resulting
story.
395. Thomas, supra note 97, at 1141 (arguing that availability of process patents should
be restricted to technological endeavors).
396. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
397. Id.
398. Knight appears to admit that this is what he is doing. See Knight, supra note 20, at
867 ("A particularly skilled patent attorney could convert a unique storyline into a method
performed by one of a series of possible infringers .... ).
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prohibition against artful drafting, his storyline method claims are not
statutory subject matter under the most recent controlling authority;
however, an en banc Federal Circuit may change course on this topic in the
upcoming rehearing of In re Bilski.399 The following section recommends
that the Bilski court affirm the Comiskey court's holding that a patentable
process must either involve a transformation or use one of the other
categories of statutory subject matter. Part III.B also recommends that the
court clarify the boundaries of abstract ideas, use the mental steps doctrine
as a proxy for addressing First Amendment concerns, and put to rest any
technological arts requirement.
B. Recommendations for Resolving the Tensions in the
Patentable Subject Matter Case Law
The Patent Laws balance the "need to encourage innovation [against] the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance." 400  The patent system's regulatory scope has expanded
dramatically in recent years, resulting in patents being issued in a broad
range of new industries, and raising concerns about the normative scope of
the patent system 40' and the role of § 101. Many commentators have
argued that § 101 should set a low bar to patentability40 2 because §§ 102
and 103 theoretically filter out inventions that are not sufficiently new or
nonobvious, and § 112 excludes inventions that are too abstract or involve
too much individual discretion to be described adequately in the
application.40 3 Other commentators argue, however, that § 101 can and
should play a more active "gate-keeping" role to curb the issuance of
patents covering certain subject matter.404 To the extent that patentable
subject matter's increased scope reflects patents being issued in newly
emerging fields, one might view the expansion as an encouraging
development because it shows that the patent system indeed is able to
"reconcile cutting-edge technologies with a statute [whose] language...
dates back to the beginning of the Republic." 405 Alternatively, many civil
libertarians fear that the expanding system increasingly issues patents that
encroach on important contravening interests, such as free speech, privacy,
and other individual liberties.406
399. See In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 WL 417680, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008);
supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing Bilski and listing questions the court
will address).
400. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
401. See supra notes 224, 371 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part I.C.
403. See supra Part I.A.
404. See supra Part I.C.
405. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), reh'g and rehg en banc denied, No. 2006-1371, 2008 WL 361044, at *1
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
406. See supra notes 224, 371 and accompanying text.
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Recent criticism from several Supreme Court justices40 7 coupled with
Congress's recent willingness to refine the scope of patentable subject
matter via statute408 suggest that the scope of patentable subject matter, and
patentable processes in particular, may be reined in either by the courts or
by the legislature. The Federal Circuit stands poised to shed light on the
proper scope of patentable processes in the upcoming en banc rehearing of
In re Bilski.409 The following section walks through each of the four
tensions discussed in Part II-the scope of statutory processes, the
boundary of the "abstract idea" judicial exclusion, the proper use of the
mental steps doctrine, and the relevance of the technological arts
requirement-and makes recommendations about how the Bilski court
should resolve each tension. It then analyzes Knight's storyline claims
using the proposed framework and concludes that they should not be
patentable.
1. The Proper Scope of Statutory Processes
The Federal Circuit held in State Street that a process employing a
mathematical algorithm constitutes patentable subject matter if it produces a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.410 As a result, post-State Street patent
applicants argue that any claim containing a series of actions that produce a
useful result qualifies as a statutory process. 411 This reasoning, aided by the
State Street court's failure to articulate a distinct two-prong analysis, is not
entirely consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Court implicitly
asks two distinct questions when it considers whether a process satisfies §
101, even where the Court focuses its attention on only one of these
questions. Essentially, the Court considers (1) whether the claimed process
is "the kind of 'discover[y]' that the statute was enacted to protect" 412 and
(2) whether the process claims any judicial exception, i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.4 13 Using the useful, concrete, and
tangible result test in isolation improperly merges these distinct inquiries.
407. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
408. See supra note 188 for a discussion of amending § 101 to exclude tax planning
patents.
409. No. 2007-1130, 2008 WL 417680, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (granting en banc
rehearing sua sponte). See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the issues the court will address.
410. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
411. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 332 at 4 (noting that since State Street and AT&T,
"many applicants appear to have assumed ... that the sole test for patent eligibility is
whether the invention produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result."); Squires & Biemer,
supra note 329, at 572 ( "[T]he State Street Court properly focused the § 101 analysis... on
whether the algorithm was being applied to produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible result.'
If such a result is produced, the claimed invention is not an abstract idea and the § 101 test is
satisfied.").
412. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); see also supra text accompanying notes
112-14.
413. For example, the Court implicitly considered both questions in Benson, Flook, and
Diehr but focused on whether the claimed process recites a patentable application of an
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Merely claiming an invention as a series of steps does not ensure that the
invention satisfies the Court's requirement that the process recites "the kind
of 'discover[y]' that the statute was enacted to protect. '4 14 Congressional
intent and the Court's jurisprudence cut against such a literal interpretation
of the term "process." Although the Chakrabarty court noted that the
history of § 101 supports a broad construction of the listed categories of
patentable subject matter,415 the Court subsequently clarified the scope of
the process category in Diehr, noting that the term "process" had a specific
meaning in the patent context even before it was added to the statute.4 16
The Court suggested that Congress adopted this preexisting judicial
definition when it amended the statute to include processes.4 17  This
conclusion is consistent with Flook, where the Court noted that "the holding
that the discovery of [Benson's] method could not be patented as a
'process' forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101.1"418
The Court consistently has held that two types of processes qualify as
statutory subject matter. First, as the Court often recites, "Transformation
and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the
patentability of a process claim. . ".. ,,419 Second, the Court also has
allowed process claims that are tied to a specific apparatus or that are
machine implemented. 420 These types of processes appear to be a subset of
those defined in § 100(b), which include "new use[s] of a known process,
machine, manufacture, [or] composition of matter. ' 421 The Federal Circuit
appears to have adopted this more inclusive conception in Comiskey,
suggesting that processes that are "embodied in, operate[] on, transform[],
or otherwise involve[] another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" constitute statutory
subject matter.422  Thus, under controlling Supreme Court precedent,
statutory processes must either produce a transformation or recite a new
method of using one of the other categories of statutory subject matter. To
illustrate the breadth of this test, consider once again the "Method of
Exercising a Cat" patent.423  The method arguably involves a
algorithm or an unpatentable algorithm. See supra Part I.B.2.a. The Comiskey court likewise
suggested that the Federal Circuit implicitly considered both questions in prior cases like
Alappat, State Street, and AT&T, noting the inventions in these cases were (1) tied to
machines and (2) involved practical applications of mathematical algorithms. See In re
Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
414. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593; see also supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
416. See supra note 334 and accompanying text-.
417. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
418. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
419. See e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
420. The inventions in Diehr, State Street, and AT&T all satisfy this criteria. See In re
Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing cases where the claimed computer
technology claims were "tied to specific machines" and held allowable).
421. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2000).
422. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1376.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
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transformation-i.e., it produces an exercised cat from an unexercised one.
Moreover, the process recites a new use of a known machine-a laser.424
Critics of the above approach argue that the Court has indicated that
producing a transformation is not an "invariable requirement" but rather is
merely one example of a statutory process. 425 Indeed, the Court remarked
in both Benson and Flook that a process may be patentable subject matter
"even if it does not meet one of [the Court's] earlier precedents." 426
However, the Benson court expressly reserved the possibility that it might
articulate further eligibility requirements in the future, noting that it wished
to avoid "freez[ing] process patents to old technologies, leaving no room
for the revelations of ... new, onrushing technology." 427 Neither Knight's
storyline methods nor Bilski's hedging methods involve a hitherto-
unknown type of technology that warrants deviating from the above test.
A statutory process test that requires a process to produce a
transformation or use one of the other categories of statutory subject matter
does raise a concern, however, that would benefit from the courts' further
guidance. As noted in Part III.A, process claims are susceptible to artful
drafting.428 This problem may be compounded by a test that allows
processes based on new uses of known machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter, as this standard may lead applicants to trivially
incorporate one of these items into one of the claimed steps. For example,
the court suggested that the arbitration claims in Comiskey that use a
computer, for example, to enroll a person or document satisfy § 101--even
though the computer might not be used to conduct any other step in the
process or to perform the actual arbitration. Indeed, Comiskey articulates a
very permissive standard for incorporating one of the other statutory
categories into a process to meet the standard. The court first lists specific
ways of incorporating the other classes of statutory subject matter-
embodying in, operating on, or transforming. 429 But the court ends this list
with the catchall phrase "or otherwise involves. '430 The Federal Circuit
needs to revisit this issue and clarify how the other classes of statutory
subject matter should be incorporated into a process to make the process
statutory subject matter.
424. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, many software-based inventions should
satisfy one or both of these criteria depending on whether "transformation" includes data
transformation. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, supra note 332, at 20 (suggesting that the
Federal Circuit's transformation test includes intangible subject matter such as signals, if the
signal represents a real world activity, and noting that the USPTO also views data
transformation as an appropriate way to evaluate subject matter eligibility).
425. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
426. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978).
427. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 395-97.
429. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
430. Id.
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2. The Proper Scope of Processes That Apply Judicial Exceptions
The second inquiry for determining subject matter eligibility involves
assessing whether the process claims a judicial exception, i.e., a law of
nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.431 While the purpose of
these judicially created exclusions is to reserve certain subject matter to the
public domain, identifying a judicial exception is not always
straightforward. 43 2 For example, applying the abstract idea exclusion can
be difficult because the Supreme Court has not provided adequate guidance
regarding when a process actually is an unpatentable abstract idea. The
Court has made clear that, though the judicial exclusions are not patentable
subject matter, processes that are practical applications of these judicial
exclusions may, in fact, be patentable subject matter.433
The courts should not simply adopt the approach that the applicant in
Bilski advocated. 434 The applicant argued that a process is not a mere
abstract idea when it sets forth a series of specific, real world, physical acts
for achieving a useful objective. 435 The applicant suggested that examples
of unpatentable abstract ideas include process claims that recite "somehow
transmitting information with electromagnetism" or "somehow supplying a
commodity at a fixed price." 436 This approach is unsuccessful because the
applicant appears to be using "useful" in the term's common parlance rather
than to indicate the specific and substantial utility mandated by § 101. 4 37
Furthermore, this approach is not productive because such nonspecific
claims would fail the § 112 written description requirement. 438 The Court
has never suggested that the abstract ideas judicial exception merely serves
as a proxy for § 112. Rather, this judicial exclusion is a separate element
and should carry the same weight as the exclusions for the laws of nature
and natural phenomena.
Judge Linn suggests that the judicial exceptions carve out and protect
subject matter that is "part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men" and
that is "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none" because "certain
innovations, no matter how new to human thought, are not the type of
technological invention to which Congress has extended patent protection,
but instead are considered to be abstract truths that were not made by
431. While this Note performs the judicial exclusion analysis as the second step, the order
of the steps does not matter as statutory subject matter must satisfy both requirements. See
supra note 95.
432. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("The line between a patentable
'process' and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear."); supra Part I.B.3.
433. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
434. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
436. Brief of Appellants, supra note 312, at 9; see also supra text accompanying notes
312-13.
437. See supra notes 84, 183 and accompanying text.
438. See supra Part I.A.
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man." 439 Judge Linn's reasoning explains the basis of the laws of nature
and natural phenomena exclusions, but the Court has suggested that the
abstract ideas exception goes further than just prohibiting subject matter
that is not "new" in the § 101 sense; instead, it seeks to reserve certain basic
building blocks of invention to the public domain. For example, the Court
articulates a concern that the ineligible claims in Morse and Benson are
abstract ideas because they attempt to preempt a principle-e.g.,
electromagnetism or a mathematical algorithm. 440
The Court suggests, however, that judicial exceptions such as those at
issue in Morse and Benson may become eligible subject matter if the
claimed process is an application of the principle rather than the principle
itself.44 1 Collectively, Morse, The Telephone Cases, Benson, Flook, and
Diehr suggest that abstract ideas may cease to be abstract when adapted and
applied to a particular end use claimed in a particular context.442 State
Street's "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test may be a relevant tool
for identifying acceptable processes; 443 but, if the test is applied merely to
filter out processes that are not "useful," it is not sufficiently inclusive.
This concern is at the heart of Justice Breyer's criticism of the Federal
Circuit's "useful, concrete and tangible result" test in his LabCorp
dissent.4" Justice Breyer believes that, while the method at issue in
LabCorp ostensibly satisfies the State Street test, it nonetheless claims too
much of a fundamental principle-in this case, a natural phenomenon. 445
The Court created the judicial exceptions to statutory subject matter as a
supplement to the other statutory requirements in order to reserve subject
matter to the public domain that §§ 102, 103, and 112 do not adequately
protect. Allowing patents on such basic building blocks of invention would
439. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra notes 181-83 and
accompanying text.
440. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing Benson); supra notes 168-69
and accompanying text (discussing Morse).
441. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2.a.
442. See supra Parts I.B.2.a, I.B.3. For example, compare Morse's unpatenable claim 8
with Bell's patentable method of using electricity to transmit speech. See supra notes 167-
75 and accompanying text. The Court distinguished Morse's patentable claims from his
unpatentable claim 8 in the Telephone Cases, stating, "the use of magnetism as a motive
power, without regard to the particular process with which it was connected in the patent,
could not be claimed, but that its use in that connection could." The Telephone Cases, 126
U.S. 1, 534 (1888). The Court again voiced its concern about processes claimed out of
context in Benson, noting that Benson's unpatentable claims "were not limited to any
particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular
end use." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
443. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
444. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
445. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2928 (2006)
("Even were I to assume (purely for argument's sake) that [the claim] meets certain general
definitions of process patentability, however, it still fails the one at issue here: the
requirement that it not amount to a simple natural correlation, i.e., a 'natural
phenomenon."').
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not "promote the Progress of... [the] useful Arts. ' 446  Due to the
supplementary nature of the judicial exceptions, the scope of the abstract
ideas exclusion must extend beyond the § 112 written description
requirements, and the law of nature/natural phenomenon exclusion similarly
must go beyond the § 102 novelty requirement. Some processes, even if
described in enough detail to perform the claimed method, may still
preempt a mere idea or a law of nature; however, claiming an application of
the idea or principle in a particular context can ameliorate this concern. The
State Street "useful, concrete, and tangible result"447 test provides a
reasonable heuristic for distinguishing such applications from the
underlying principle. But reducing the inquiry to an assessment of whether
the process produces the indicated result and whether this result is "useful"
in the nontechnical sense eviscerates the test and fails to protect the judicial
exclusions. As discussed above, the Court has indicated that abstract ideas
may cease to be abstract when adapted and applied to a particular end use
claimed in a particular context.448 Thus, the proper test should require the
process to claim an application that (1) has substantial utility,449 (2) is
implemented in a specific fashion, and (3) has a specific end use.
3. The Proper Role of the Mental Steps Doctrine
As discussed above, courts previously have used the mental steps
doctrine to exclude methods that contain steps involving human thinking or
activity. 450 This doctrine has a range of applications.451 Courts sometimes
invoked it to exclude methods that involved a "purely mental step" like
correlating, even when the operator's role was mainly manipulative and
only required routine, nonsubjective mental activity.452 On other occasions,
courts used the doctrine to exclude methods that required the operator's
subjective judgment, interpretation, aesthetic input, or emotional response
and whose operation thus varied unpredictably depending on the
operator. 453 In addition to having a range of applications, the mental steps
exclusion can be applied to claims in numerous ways, further complicating
use of the doctrine. The mental steps doctrine can be applied to (1) each
step of a method, (2) only the steps pertaining to the "point of novelty," or
(3) the claim as a whole rather than any individual step.454
The mental steps limiting doctrine may not be necessary after applying
the two-prong analysis discussed above. To the extent that the doctrine
446. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra Part I.A.
447. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
448. See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 84, 183 and accompanying text.
450. See supra Part I.B.4.a.
451. See supra Part I.B.4.a.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
453. See supra Part I.B.4.a. These types of claims will fail the written description
requirement. See supra notes 323-35 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
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remains relevant, the courts first should articulate a rationale for needing to
use the mental steps doctrine to limit the scope of patentable subject matter.
The courts then must determine whether the written description
requirement, the judicial exclusion of abstract ideas, and the test for
statutory processes already satisfy these needs. While courts frequently
invoked the mental steps doctrine when they were wrestling with the
patentability of software claims, the doctrine fell out of vogue as software
claims became accepted subject matter.455  In Musgrave, the court
dismissed the notion that the case law "requires all steps of a statutory
'process' to be physical acts applied to physical things. '456 Thus, a process
should not be per se unpatentable just because certain steps do not involve
physical acts applied to physical things. Indeed, the approach the Federal
Circuit recently used in Comiskey is quite narrow. The court held that a
process of human thinking, standing alone-such as a method of
arbitration-is not statutory subject matter.457 Inventors must be free to
think in order to invent,458 and allowing patents on human thinking by itself
will unacceptably limit invention. The court further held that "a claim that
involves both a mental process and one of the other categories of statutory
subject matter (i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition) may be
patentable under § 101."459 This holding indicates that tying a process that
contains mental steps to one of the other categories of statutory subject
matter alleviates the concern about improperly patenting human thinking
standing alone. The proposed two-prong test discussed above makes the
mental steps test redundant because the first step requires that a statutory
process produce a transformation or involve one of the other categories of
statutory subject matter. To the extent that a "transforming" process that
does not involve one of the other types of statutory subject matter raises a
mental steps concern, the written description requirement and the judicial
exceptions are sufficient tools to analyze the claimed invention.
Misapplication of State Street has created room for subject matter that
conflicts with various external rights, including thinking and speech. 460
Commentators have noted that "free speech issues arose only rarely with
regard to the patent statute" prior to State Street.461 Copyright protection
historically has come into conflict with First Amendment concerns much
more often than patent law. 462 Indeed, copyright law has developed a set of
455. See supra Part I.B.4.a.
456. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
457. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
459. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
460. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing subject matter that conflicts
with other rights); supra text accompanying note 371 (same).
461. See Thomas, supra note 224, at 588-89 (discussing the work of Mark Lemley and
Eugene Volokh). This is because patentees receive the right to prohibit the use or sale of a
claimed invention or process-an activity that usually does not impinge on others' speech.
See id.
462. See id. at 588-92 (comparing the potential conflict between speech/patent law and
speech/copyright law).
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doctrines to protect First Amendment rights, whereas patent law has had
little impetus to do SO. 4 6 3 As discussed above, applying the proposed test
along with the other statutory requirements make it unlikely that these
conflicting types of processes will be patentable. To the extent that some
impinging processes remain patentable, the patent regime, like copyright,
may need to develop restraining doctrines. The mental steps exclusion is a
likely candidate, and the courts should consider using the mental steps
exclusion when the claims as a whole-despite satisfying the requirements
of §§ 102, 103, and 112 and not implicating the judicial exceptions-
substantially limit First Amendment rights. Alternatively, the courts could
freely grant such patents but reduce the protections conveyed by such
speech-limiting patents by borrowing and employing copyright law's
restraining doctrines when assessing infringement.
4. The Proper Role of the Technological Arts Requirement
The Patent Clause, the patent statutes, and Supreme Court jurisprudence
do not explicitly require patentable subject matter to be technological in
nature;464  however, the potential reach of process patents to
nontechnological fields after Lundgren has created much controversy.465
Prior to State Street and AT&T, statutory processes either produced a
physical transformation or were tied to a particular apparatus. 466 While an
originalist interpretation of the term "useful Arts" in the Patent Clause
could have served as a basis for an explicit technological arts
requirement, 467 the transformation and apparatus constraints kept statutory
processes out of the cultural and liberal arts without formally requiring that
a process be within the technological arts. Thus, prior to State Street, a
technological arts test was unnecessary. After State Street and AT&T
reduced the statutory process analysis to no more than a usefulness test,
however, a technological arts requirement became a potentially important
tool to control the scope of statutory processes.
While the courts have a constitutional basis for articulating a
technological arts test, 468 the better solution is to return to a more stringent
analysis of subject matter eligibility. Limiting statutory processes to the
"kind of 'discoveries' that the statute was enacted to protect 469 by
requiring that processes involve a transformation or a new use of a known
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is more consistent with
Supreme Court precedent than is creating a technological arts test.
Moreover, the former also will effectively keep statutory processes out of
the cultural and liberal arts. Even Judge Barrett, who argued in his
463. See id.
464. See supra text accompanying note 367.
465. See, e.g., supra note 371 and accompanying text.
466. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
467. See supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
469. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
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Lundgren concurrence that a technological arts test is unworkable, proposed
to limit the patentability of non-machine-implemented processes to those
that involve a physical transformation. 470 Thus, faithfully applying the two-
prong test discussed above makes the technological arts test redundant and
unnecessary.
5. Knight's Storyline Processes Should Not Be Patentable Subject Matter
Distilling Supreme Court precedent, this Note argues that statutory
processes (1) must be "the kind of 'discover[y]' that the statute was enacted
to protect, '471 i.e., produce a transformation or use one of the other
categories of statutory subject matter; and (2) must not claim a judicial
exception, i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract
idea.472 Applying this two-prong test, Knight's storyline process claims do
not recite statutory processes. His claims neither produce a transformation
nor encompass a new use of a known machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. 473 Furthermore, his claims do not present a good
case for departing from these well-established criteria because his
inventions do not involve a hitherto-unknown type of technology that
warrants developing a different test.474 In addition to failing the first prong
of the analysis, Knight's claims in their current state are abstract ideas;475
they are disembodied concepts that preempt subsequent use of a mere idea
because they are neither limited to any particular end use nor are claimed in
a particular context.476 In other words, Knight's broad claims do not recite
an application of an idea; rather, they attempt to claim the idea itself. This
is not to say that a detailed, context-specific storyline claim embodying a
single storyline will always constitute an abstract idea; however, that would
look much like an actual novel or script and is not the problem Knight seeks
to address. 477 Finally, a mental steps analysis, particularly one that seeks to
protect First Amendment speech interests, also would exclude Knight's
claims. 478  Ultimately, Knight's storyline process claims neither are
patentable subject matter under current case law, nor should they be.
470. See supra note 217; supra text accompanying note 373.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
472. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
473. See supra Part III.B. 1.
474. See supra Part III.B. 1.
475. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the rationale for the abstract idea judicial
exclusion).
476. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Court's concerns about allowing patents that
preempt basic principles and mere ideas and noting that applying the principle in a specific
manner may overcome this concern).
477. See supra Part I.D.
478. See supra Part III.B.3.
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CONCLUSION
The boundaries of patentable subject matter expanded post-State Street
to the point that Knight's proposed storyline process claims could plausibly
be considered statutory subject matter. While Knight's applications were
filed in a State Street world, the landscape has changed recently and likely
will continue to change as the Federal Circuit addresses the proper scope of
statutory processes in the upcoming en banc rehearing of In re Bilski, which
should specifically address the scope of statutory processes, the boundaries
of the abstract ideas judicial exclusion, and the role of the mental steps
doctrine. This Note concludes that Knight's storyline applications are not
patentable subject matter under the Federal Circuit's current binding
precedent, In re Comiskey. Further, in light of principles distilled from
controlling Supreme Court case law, this Note advocates a two-step
approach for determining the subject matter eligibility of processes. First,
unless a process involves hitherto-unknown technology, it must produce a
transformation or be a new method of using one of the other statutory
classes of subject matter-machines, manufactures, or compositions of
matter. To improve the application of this test, the courts must clarify the
nexus needed when a process uses one of the other classes of statutory
subject matter. Further, processes may not claim a judicial exception-i.e.,
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. A process applying
a judicial exception does not impermissibly claim the judicial exception
itself if it (1) has substantial utility, (2) is implemented in a specific fashion,
and (3) has a specific end use. Proper use of this test should reduce or
eliminate the need for other limiting doctrines. If, however, after applying
the test articulated above, eligible processes remain that impinge on First
Amendment rights, the courts should consider employing the mental steps
test to protect these interests. Finally, given the above framework, there is
no need for the courts to define and adopt a technological arts requirement
at this time. Ultimately, Knight's storyline process claims fail several
points of this suggested analysis and should not be eligible subject matter.
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